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ABSTRACT
Over the last ten years there has been a marked shift in U.S.
immigration law away from reliance upon statutory authorization
and regulatory provisions to subregulatory or “liminal” rules and
discretionary decision-making. This trend is apparent in both federal
immigration law and in state and local rulemaking affecting
immigrant communities. This Article proposes a new theoretical
framework within which to analyze this phenomenon. It uses
“covering,” a legal theory first developed in the context of employment
discrimination and equal protection, as a lens through which to view
these recent developments in immigration law and policy. It shows
how immigration laws operate to promote immigration status
“conversion,” “passing,” and “covering.” It charts the proliferation, in
the last decade, of “covering” provisions that do not alter immigrants’
underlying immigration statuses but nonetheless facilitate their
integration into American society, and it discusses the normative
advantages and disadvantages of this increasingly prevalent phen-
omenon.
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When you talk about ... what the legacy of the American Dream
is, what I think about is this freedom to migrate and freedom to
move and freedom to dream.
Jose Antonio Vargas1
INTRODUCTION
Each year, hundreds of thousands of immigrants arrive in the
United States in search of their own American Dream. Refugees are
fleeing war-torn Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan.2 Unaccompanied
children are seeking refuge from gang violence in Central America.3
STEM workers trained overseas are being recruited by U.S. com-
panies.4 International students are pursuing degrees at colleges and
universities in the United States.5 U.S. citizens are falling in love
with and marrying foreigners.6 Migrant workers are risking their
health and safety by crossing the southwest border without inspec-
tion.7 But for millions of immigrants who have tried to make their
homes in the United States in recent years, pursuit of the Ameri-
can Dream appears ever more elusive. Vehement anti-immigrant
1. Anna Holmes, Jose Antonio Vargas on Immigration and the American Dream, FUSION
(Nov. 24, 2014, 10:01 AM) (quoting Self Evidence: Jose Antonio Vargas (Fusion web broadcast
Nov. 24, 2014)), http://fusion.net/story/29413/self-evidence-jose-antonio-vargas-on-immigra
tion-and-the-american-dream/ [https://perma.cc/P99J-EB58].
2. See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, SHORENSTEIN CTR. ON MEDIA, POLITICS, & PUB. POLICY, THE
UNITED STATES AND THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS: A PLAN OF ACTION 3 (2016), http://shoren
steincenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Syria-Crisis-Plan-of-Action.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9SKH-4B5Z].
3. See Annie Hylton & Sarah Salvadore, “They Said We Would Pay with Our Lives,”
SLATE (Aug. 31, 2016, 7:30 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/gender_and_
migration/2016/08/as_central_american_gangs_target_younger_kids_more_minors_are_fle
eing_to.html [https://perma.cc/R3B7-LBJD].
4. See RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42530, IMMIGRATION OF FOREIGN
NATIONALS WITH SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, AND MATHEMATICS (STEM) DEGREES
2 (2012).
5. See Miriam Jordan, International Students Stream into U.S. Colleges, WALL STREET
J. (Mar. 24, 2015, 10:00 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/international-students-stream-into-
u-s-colleges-1427248801 [https://perma.cc/KBC8-MXEG].
6. See Jake Grovum, 1 in 5 Married Households in USA Has Foreign-Born Spouse, USA
TODAY (Sept. 6, 2013, 11:05 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/06/
stateline-marriages-foreign-spouse/2775271/ [https://perma.cc/TJT4-7WPS].
7. See Brian Bennett, Illegal Border Crossings by Central American Families Increase
Again, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2016, 12:25 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-border-
crossings-20161017-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/Q6E4-FQJK].
768 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:765
rhetoric was a hallmark of the 2016 presidential election.8 Public
figures, ranging from state governors to popular entertainers, have
condemned immigrant communities.9 Comprehensive immigration
reform, once a widely debated and seemingly attainable goal,
appears to be completely out of reach.10
In the face of congressional recalcitrance and widespread hostility
to legislative or regulatory reforms to immigration laws, various
governmental actors at the federal, state, and local levels have
adopted a different approach, turning instead to subregulatory or
“liminal” rules and discretionary decision-making. Perhaps the
most well known of these initiatives are President Obama’s two
deferred action programs. The first, Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA), was originally introduced in 2012 and then
expanded in 2014 to provide temporary relief from deportation to
undocumented immigrants who had been brought to the United
States as children and are now young adults.11 The second, Deferred
Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents
(DAPA), was introduced in 2014 and was designed to provide
similar temporary relief from deportation for the undocumented
parents of children who are U.S. citizens or lawful permanent
residents.12 On June 23, 2016, the Supreme Court of the United
States, in a one-line per curiam opinion, affirmed “by an equally
8. See Alexander Burns, Republicans Fire Up Immigration Talk Heading into South
Carolina, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/13/us/politics/
republicans-fire-up-immigration-talk-heading-into-south-carolina.html [https://perma.cc/
8ZDA-X8VA]; Jonathan Martin & Patrick Healy, In Republican Debate, Candidates Battle
Sharply on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes. com/2015/11/11/us/
republican-debate-fox-business.html [https://perma.cc/7EHP-YD3S].
9. See, e.g., Patrick Healy & Julie Bosman, G.O.P. Governors Vow to Close Doors to
Syrian Refugees, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/17/us/politics/
gop-governors-vow-to-close-doors-to-syrian-refugees.html [https://perma.cc/59EM-64YA]
(describing how twenty-five Republican governors vowed to block the entry of Syrian refugees
to their states).
10. See, e.g., Aaron Blake, Immigration Reform Just Went from Extremely Unlikely to
Impossible, WASH. POST (Sept. 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2014/09/10/immigration-reform-just-went-from-impossible-to-more-impossible/
[https://perma.cc/7FD8-W4DF] (describing how the surge of unaccompanied minors at the
southern border led to unprecedented levels of opposition to comprehensive immigration
reform).
11. See Executive Actions on Immigration, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://
www.uscis.gov/immigrationaction [https://perma.cc/AG6G-D4J3] (last updated Apr. 15, 2015).
12. See id.
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divided Court” a federal appellate court ruling preventing the DAPA
and expanded DACA programs from going forward at this time.13
DACA and DAPA have been the subject of extensive and thoughtful
scholarly analysis.14 But they are just one iteration of the wider
phenomenon of discretionary, contingent, and subregulatory
immigration-related rulemaking at the federal, state, and local
levels. This wider topic has recently begun to receive scholarly
attention.15 It remains, however, undertheorized. This Article
attempts to fill that gap by proposing a new theoretical framework
within which to analyze this phenomenon. The Article uses “cover-
ing,” a legal theory first developed in the context of employment
discrimination and equal protection, as a lens through which to view
these recent developments in immigration law.
In 2002, Professor Kenji Yoshino published his groundbreaking
article, Covering, in the Yale Law Journal.16 Drawing upon the work
of sociologist Erving Goffman on stigma,17 Professor Yoshino identi-
fied three potential approaches to assimilation18 for traditionally
13. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (per curiam). The Supreme Court,
divided 4-4, upheld the Fifth Circuit’s affirmance of the trial court’s preliminary injunction.
Id. Thus, the injunction remains in place, and the case is now set to go to trial.
14. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law
Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104, 136-42 (2015); Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The
Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take
Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 856-57 (2013); Hiroshi Motomura, Lecture, The President’s
Dilemma: Executive Authority, Enforcement, and the Rule of Law in Immigration Law, 55
WASHBURN L.J. 1, 3-5 (2015); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty,
67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 768-69 (2014).
15. Several scholars have provided illuminating accounts of the existence of liminality in
immigration law and the experiences of the immigrant communities subject to it. See, e.g.,
SAMEER M. ASHAR ET AL., NAVIGATING LIMINAL LEGALITIES ALONG PATHWAYS TO CITIZENSHIP:
IMMIGRANT VULNERABILITY AND THE ROLE OF MEDIATING INSTITUTIONS (2015), http://www.
russellsage.org/sites/default/files/RSFReport_FINAL_2-16-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/EY5U-
AA99]; Geoffrey Heeren, The Status of Nonstatus, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1115, 1134 (2015); Cecilia
Menjívar, Liminal Legality: Salvadoran and Guatemalan Immigrants’ Lives in the United
States, 111 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 999, 1010-19 (2006); Stephen Manning & Juliet Stumpf, Liminal
Immigration Law 17-20 (Oct. 16, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
16. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002); see also KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING:
THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 26-27 (2006) (offering personal experiences to
illustrate the concept of covering).
17. Yoshino, supra note 16, at 772 (citing ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE
MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 102-04 (1963)).
18. The term “assimilation” is itself somewhat freighted. For many years, both in the
United States and elsewhere, scholars and advocates have proposed focusing on immigrant
“integration” or “inclusion” rather than “assimilation.” See, e.g., John C. Harles, Integration
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marginalized or discriminated-against groups. According to Profes-
sor Yoshino, assimilation could involve “conversion,” “passing,” or
“covering.”19 Conversion occurs when an individual alters her under-
lying identity in such a way as to remove the disfavored aspect.20
Passing occurs when a person presents herself in such a way as to
hide the underlying identity, which nonetheless remains un-
changed.21 Covering occurs when an individual neither alters nor
actively hides her underlying identity, but downplays disfavored
characteristics, enabling others to disattend that aspect of her
identity.22 As Professor Yoshino acknowledged, the latter two forms
of assimilation are not always readily distinguishable because the
same actions could be either passing or covering, depending on the
preexisting knowledge of the audience to such actions.23 This Article
explores recent developments in immigration law, and the attendant
experiences of immigrants themselves, using the covering frame-
work. 
The Article begins by addressing conventional understandings of
assimilation by conversion, passing, and covering. Part I discusses
the scholarly literature that employs the covering framework to
analyze discrimination against groups such as racial minorities,
women, LGBTQ individuals, and members of certain religious
communities. It briefly outlines how this traditional approach to
covering theory may apply to sociocultural understandings of
immigrant identity. Of course, a difference exists between an indi-
vidual’s legal status as an immigrant and his social status and
experience as a “foreigner” or “outsider.” For all immigrants, the
need to convert, pass, or cover is sometimes based on the social
issues of being from elsewhere, sometimes based on formal immigra-
tion status, and sometimes based on the intersection of the two. In
that respect, immigration law both converges with and diverges
from the broader culture of immigrant assimilation.
Before Assimilation: Immigration, Multiculturalism and the Canadian Polity, 30 CANADIAN
J. POL. SCI. 711, 713-15 (1997). However, “assimilation” is the term used by Professor Yoshino
and is therefore the term used throughout this Article.
19. Yoshino, supra note 16, at 772.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
2017] IMMIGRANT COVERING 771
In some circumstances, the operation of immigration law may
permit or foster conversion—both as a matter of legal status and as
a matter of identity. In other circumstances, it may mandate pass-
ing or facilitate covering. However, it does not exist in a vacuum;
immigrants may convert or pass or cover along multiple axes—
racial, religious, gender-based, or orientation-based, as well as with
respect to their immigrant identity or formal immigration status.
The intersectionality of these multiple identities may make it
difficult to understand the relative importance of immigration-law-
related concerns.24 For example, a pregnant undocumented worker
may seek to conceal or downplay her pregnancy for a variety of
identity-based reasons. As a consequence, whether she is passing or
covering because of her gender, her employment status, her identity
as an immigrant, or her lack of formal immigration status is a
complex question. Nonetheless, it is a question worth parsing,
particularly when immigration law itself may determine the options
available to her. The primary focus of this Article is on the operation
of federal, state, and local government laws and policies, rather
than on the sociocultural experience of immigrant identity. Of
course the latter is highly significant,25 but the main focus of this
piece is the current legal framework—that is, the immigration-
related statutes, regulations, subregulatory rules, and legal doc-
trine. The remainder of the Article, therefore, while touching on the
role covering plays with regard to the sociocultural immigrant
experience, principally addresses the salience of the covering theory
in the context of formal immigration status.
Part II considers the ways in which recent developments in
immigration laws and policies may be characterized as embodying
the concepts of “conversion,” “passing,” and “covering” with respect
to immigration status. Part II.A begins with a discussion of im-
migration status “conversion.” First, it examines the traditional
24. For a detailed exploration of intersectionality in the context of racial and gender iden-
tities, see generally CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2003).
25. The work of scholars such as Leisy Abrego, Cecilia Menjívar, and Debora Ortega, in
particular, sheds much-needed light on the realities of these experiences. See Leisy J. Abrego,
Legal Consciousness of Undocumented Latinos: Fear and Stigma as Barriers to Claims-Mak-
ing for First- and 1.5-Generation Immigrants, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 337, 349 (2011); Menjívar,
supra note 15, at 1010-17; Ashley-Marie Vollmer Hanna & Debora Marie Ortega, Salir
Adelante (Perserverance): Lessons from the Mexican Immigrant Experience, 16 J. SOC. WORK
47, 53 (2016).
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avenues for immigration status conversion under federal law, such
as conversion of an immigrant to a citizen via naturalization, or
conversion of a temporary migrant to a permanent resident via
adjustment of status.26 It then outlines the limited and indirect role
that state law may play in status conversion through, for example,
state regulation of marriage and adoption—which are often predi-
cates for immigration status conversion by the federal government.
Part II.A also discusses the role that state courts may play in
immigrant conversion via the grant of special immigrant juvenile
status to immigrant youth.
Part II.B discusses immigration status “passing,” which occurs as
a result of the practical operation of various federal, state, and local
laws. First, it considers the ways in which the framework of selec-
tive enforcement of federal immigration laws with respect to both
immigrant exclusion and immigrant employment have created a
long-standing pattern and practice of undocumented immigrants
present in the United States passing as documented migrants.27
Second, it discusses state laws, including federal-state immigration
enforcement cooperation agreements, “attrition through enforce-
ment” state initiatives, and state laws restricting immigrant
employment.28 Third, it discusses local laws and ordinances, such as
Illegal Immigration Relief Acts and “don’t ask, don’t tell” ordinan-
ces, which have been passed in recent years and which effectively
require immigrants to pass as holders of a different immigration
status in order to interact with state government officials.
Finally, Part II.C discusses immigration status “covering,” which
has flourished and multiplied at the federal, state, and local levels
in the last decade. First, it considers recent developments in federal
law, including the DACA and DAPA programs, as well as the other
initiatives providing some unlawfully present immigrants contin-
gent “lawful presence” in the United States without formal immigra-
tion status.29 Second, it discusses immigrant covering embodied in
26. Adjustment of status is the process by which an eligible individual already in the
United States can get permanent resident status (a “green card”) without having to return to
their home country to complete visa processing. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255b (2012) (discussing the
adjustment of status of nonimmigrant to that of person admitted for permanent residence). 
27. See Rose Cuison Villazor, The Undocumented Closet, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1, 60 (2013).
28. See id. at 37.
29. See Heeren, supra note 15, at 1120.
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state laws, such as state “DREAM Acts”30 and state protocols for
issuing driver’s licenses to the undocumented. Third, and finally, it
discusses immigrant covering at the municipal and local levels,
including, but not limited to, sanctuary city ordinances and mu-
nicipal and community identification cards.
The Article concludes in Part III by exploring the normative
dimensions of this perspective on the widespread emergence of
government-sanctioned immigrant covering and its potential long-
term implications. It draws upon the work of scholars writing about
covering in other legal contexts and applies and further develops
their insights in the new context of immigration status covering.
Whether the growing trend toward covering by operation of federal,
state, and local laws benefits or harms immigrants is a complex
question. On the one hand, the move from passing to covering opens
up opportunities and facilitates greater participation in mainstream
society by hitherto marginalized immigrant groups. For example,
undocumented immigrants were traditionally only able to assert
certain rights or access certain services by concealing their status
and passing, and so the introduction of federal, state, and local
initiatives facilitating covering are surely an improved alternative.
On the other hand, each of the initiatives that functionally foster
immigrant covering are temporary, contingent, and dependent upon
the grace of the majority, rather than the individual rights or
human dignity of the immigrants affected by them. These sub-
regulatory initiatives offer no permanent, stable resolution for
individual immigrants and no recognition of their communities.
Instead, these policies calcify the stigma of undocumented status at
the very same time that they provide a vehicle for the majority to
disattend to that status. Covering in other contexts permits majority
groups to ignore or minimize the plight of minorities because they
have less visibility. The same is true in the immigration arena.
Here, the initiatives that perform functionally as a form of covering
may ultimately blunt the urgency with which comprehensive immi-
gration reform is addressed. In large part, nonconversion covering
solutions may be seen as “good enough” by some immigrants and
30. The term “DREAM Act” for legislation benefiting young undocumented minors derives
from a bill originally introduced in Congress in 2001. See Development, Relief, and Education
for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, S. 1291, 107th Cong. (2001).
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their allies, thereby leading to less (or less ambitious) advocacy for
fundamental change and potentially cementing a stigmatized un-
documented identity at the unobserved core of political discourse
about immigration law.
In Covering, Professor Yoshino posited that “[a]ssimilation is the
magic in the American Dream.”31 That has always been the case for
immigrant communities. Today, for the millions of immigrants liv-
ing throughout the United States, an increasing array of federal,
state, and local laws, regulations, and subregulatory policies provide
both barriers to and opportunities for the realization of that dream.
The covering paradigm provides valuable insight into hitherto
underexplored aspects of this phenomenon. Immigrant covering, in
its many and varied guises, therefore warrants considerable
discussion and exploration. This Article is intended to begin that
conversation.
I. THE COVERING PARADIGM
This Part provides a brief overview of the framework of assimila-
tion—conversion, passing, and covering—that was first outlined by
Professor Yoshino.32 It discusses Professor Yoshino’s work and that
of other scholars who have subsequently critiqued and developed his
theories to analyze discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity,
sex, religion, and other identity-based characteristics.
A. Conversion
“Conversion” is defined by Professor Yoshino as the permanent
alteration of underlying identity-based characteristics.33 He de-
scribes assimilation via conversion as the “magic in the American
dream ... [that] permits us to become not only Americans, but the
kind of Americans we seek to be.”34 Through the process of conver-
sion from the status of “other” or “outsider,” the newcomer may set
aside divisive classifications or identifications and may embrace, or
31. Yoshino, supra note 16, at 771.
32. See id. at 772.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 771.
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be embraced by, the majority culture.35 Or at least that is the
theory.
The term “conversion” has traditionally had strongly religious
overtones. As part of its entry for the term, the Oxford English
Dictionary defines “conversion” as “[t]he turning of sinners to God;
a spiritual change from sinfulness ... to love of God and pursuit of
holiness” and “[t]he bringing of any one over to a specified religious
faith ... from what is regarded as falsehood or error.”36 It then gives
examples of such experiences, ranging from the mass conversion of
the Anglo-Saxons by Christian missionaries to an individual’s
conversion from Judaism to Christianity.37 As conventionally
understood in this context, conversion is a profound experience
whereby an individual leaves behind his prior worldview and
embraces his new faith. Conversion is thus absolute, changing not
just the way that individuals express their identity, but also the
fundamental underpinnings of that very identity. For example, a
Muslim woman who converts to Christianity may abandon the
visible or outward expressions of the tenets of her prior faith, such
as wearing a hijab or praying five times per day. But equally
important is her inner repudiation of Islam and her commitment to
salvation through acceptance of the teachings of the Christian
gospel. Once she has committed herself to her new faith—usually
through confirmation, baptism, or some other profession of
faith—she becomes, in theory at least, accepted as an equal member
of the majority faith community. In other words, she has moved
from outsider to member of the majority in-group and has funda-
mentally altered a hitherto disadvantaged characteristic.
In his Covering article and book of the same name, Professor
Yoshino describes instances in which gay men and lesbians were
pressured to “convert” and embrace a straight identity.38 He high-
lights, in particular, the prevalence of so-called conversion therapy
during the mid-twentieth century.39 For the individuals and organ-
izations advocating for conversion therapy, homosexuality is either
a “metaphorical disease” to be cured or a permissive lifestyle choice
35. See id. at 772.
36. Conversion, 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 870-71 (2d ed. 1989).
37. See id.
38. See YOSHINO, supra note 16, at 33-35; Yoshino, supra note 16, at 784.
39. Yoshino, supra note 16, at 784-85.
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to be rejected, rather than an immutable aspect of an individual’s
identity.40 Professor Yoshino effectively critiques the suggestion that
conversion is desirable (or, indeed, even possible) for LGBTQ-
identified individuals41 and he underscores that today none of the
major mental health organizations in the United States endorse
conversion therapy.42 But, at the same time, he acknowledges that
despite increased understanding of the centrality of sexuality to an
individual’s fundamental identity, there is still a gap between
widespread perception of the relative “fixedness” of sexual orienta-
tion and other core characteristics.43 Hence, Professor Yoshino
argues, the long-standing focus of antidiscrimination laws and
policies was on groups, such as racial minorities and women, that
were marked by “immutable” and “visible” characteristics that made
them “physiologically incapable of blending into the mainstream.”44
Like gay men, lesbians, and members of religious minority
groups, immigrants are not instantly, visibly recognizable as out-
siders because of their identity as noncitizens.45 Moreover, for some
commentators, in common with religious belief or sexual preference,
immigration status or immigrant identity is perceived as a choice,
rather than as a nonbehavioral characteristic.46 As a consequence,
at least theoretically, and along some axes, conversion to full (or at
least fuller) participation in the mainstream is possible for some
members of immigrant groups. An immigrant’s outsider status may
be defined by a lack of U.S. citizenship, lack of permanent residency,
lack of English-language proficiency, or experiences of social or
cultural exclusion. In the case of the latter two examples, there is a
long history in the United States of immigrants and their children
choosing to abandon the languages and cultural practices of their
40. Id. at 801.
41. Id. at 781-83.
42. See YOSHINO, supra note 16, at 40-41; Yoshino, supra note 16, at 799-800.
43. See Yoshino, supra note 16, at 876-77.
44. Id. at 771, 877.
45. Such an immigrant’s race, ethnicity, or religious practices may, of course, distinguish
her from the majority in other ways.
46. But see Carolyn Tyjewski, Ghosts in the Machine: Civil Rights Laws and the Hybrid
“Invisible Other,” in CRITICAL DISABILITY THEORY: ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, POLICY,
AND LAW 106, 110 (Dianne Pothier & Richard Devlin eds., 2006) (“None of these categories
[race, gender, sex, and sexuality] is fixed, and anyone can become disabled, raced, gendered,
sexed, or sexualized depending on the time, space, place, and moment of any given expe-
rience.”).
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countries of origin to more fully embrace mainstream “American”
life. The prevalence of monolingual English speakers among second-
and third-generation Americans is well documented,47 as is the
popularity of “Americanization” of “foreign-sounding” names.48 In
both instances, this conversion of cultural identity is absolute; re-
claiming lost linguistic competency or revisiting hitherto abandoned
naming conventions, while not impossible, is often infeasible.
However, the focus of this Article is on the legal mechanisms that
permit immigrant conversion from one formal legal status to
another. In Part II, I therefore show how immigration status
conversion operates—and fails to operate—in the context of federal,
state, and local laws.
B. Passing
“Passing” involves the hiding of disfavored identity characteristics
by the individual endowed with those characteristics. The Oxford
English Dictionary defines this use of the term as “being accepted,
or representing oneself successfully as, a member of a different ...
group.”49 Historically, the groups in question were predominantly
racial, ethnic, or religious, with nonwhite, non-Anglo Saxon, and
non-Protestant individuals seeking to pass as members of the
dominant white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant majority.50 Today, the
term “passing” is also used in the context of lesbians, gay men, and
bisexual people passing as heterosexual.51 Unlike conversion, where
47. See Richard Alba, Bilingualism Persists, but English Still Dominates, MIGRATION
POL’Y INST. (Feb. 1, 2005), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/bilingualism-persists-
english-still-dominates [https://perma.cc/6KN8-6938] (“[S]peaking only English is the
predominant pattern by the third generation.”).
48. See Costanza Biavaschi et al., The Economic Payoff of Name Americanization 25 (Inst.
for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 7725, 2013), http://ftp.iza.org/dp7725.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2UQP-L8Y8] (analyzing longitudinal data to show that since the 1930s
immigrants changing their names to more stereotypically American versions have benefited
from enhanced employment opportunities).
49. Passing, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2005). The Oxford English Dictionary
definition continues to specify that this term is used in the United States to refer to a person
with some black ancestry “passing” as white. Id.
50. See generally PASSING AND THE FICTIONS OF IDENTITY (Elaine K. Ginsberg ed., 1996).
51. See Daniel G. Renfrow, A Cartography of Passing in Everyday Life, 27 SYMBOLIC
INTERACTION 485, 493, 495-96 (2004). See generally PASSING: IDENTITY AND INTERPRETATION
IN SEXUALITY, RACE, AND RELIGION (María Carla Sánchez & Linda Schlossberg eds., 2001).
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the prior identity is abandoned or subsumed by the new, passing
involves the modification of outward expressions of identity “for
popular consumption” while the underlying identity is preserved.52
Professor Randall Kennedy suggests that, seen in this light, passing
is a necessary “deception that enables a person to adopt specific
roles or identities from which he or she would otherwise be barred
by prevailing social standards.”53 In this respect, passing may be a
way in which to evade identity-based discrimination.
At the same time, however, the prevalence of passing, and the
experience of pressure by minority individuals to pass as members
of the majority, is an effect of the same identity-based discrimina-
tion. Professor Yoshino argues that to pass is to seek actively to be
“misjudged” and therefore misunderstood by one’s colleagues and
peers.54 For example, a gay man passing as straight in the work-
place may involve making a wide range of behavioral changes to
conform to stereotypical expectations of performative masculinity.55
These changes may range from controlling “nuances of appearance
and gesture,” to inventing a fictitious girlfriend, to feigning interest
in sports, to laughing at homophobic jokes.56 For lesbians, passing
in the workplace may involve gender conformity to “feminine”
norms. This may involve altering one’s physical appearance by
wearing make-up and jewelry, or having long hair.57 It may also
involve acting less confrontationally, speaking more softly, and
undertaking stereotypically feminine roles in group projects or
exercises.
For many individuals who opt to pass in some environments,
such as the workplace, there may be other contexts—such as the
home, the family, or social circles—in which they are “out of the
closet” and therefore free to express their authentic selves.58
However, the workplace is not the only domain in which individuals
52. Yoshino, supra note 16, at 786.
53. RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND
ADOPTION 283 (2003).
54. Yoshino, supra note 16, at 813.
55. Professor Judith Butler introduced the notion of performativity in the context of
gender identity. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF
IDENTITY 179 (1999).
56. Yoshino, supra note 16, at 813.
57. See id. at 780.
58. See id. at 820.
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from minority groups experience the pressure to pass. The same gay
men and lesbians who alter their behavior and appearance in the
workplace to pass as straight may face similar pressures within
their family groups. They may even experience countervailing
pressures to conform to different stereotypes in other social
contexts. Professor Angela Onwuachi-Willig describes this latter
phenomenon as “in-group passing,” highlighting the ways in which
gay people may feel compelled to perform their identities in certain
ways to maintain credibility as members of the queer community.59
Thus, “lipstick lesbians” may experience pressure to behave in more
“butch” ways,60 and “straight-acting” gay men may feel that they
need to adopt more “effeminate” mannerisms.61 Just as with out-
group passing amongst the majority culture, in these circumstances
the individuals in question are trying to gain acceptance by
attempting to fulfill roles that their own identity group has deemed
“appropriate” for them.62
Passing as a legitimate member of the dominant majority group
is a phenomenon that implicates many aspects of the immigrant
experience—an immigrant may pass with respect to her formal
immigration status, her national origin, or her sociocultural back-
ground. Certain lawfully present immigrants may opt to not disclose
their immigration status when interviewing with potential employ-
ers for fear that the mere fact that they will need some form of visa
sponsorship will preclude them from consideration for a position.
Similarly, lawful permanent residents (LPRs), also known as green
card holders, may decline to identify as noncitizens in any number
of social or professional settings. Undocumented immigrants, who
crossed a U.S. border without inspection or who overstayed their
visas, face an even greater pressure to conceal their status and
identity in a variety of circumstances.
One immigration scholar has already identified the parallels
between being closeted in the LGBTQ context and concealing
immigration status and immigrant identity. In The Undocumented
59. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Essay, Undercover Other, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 873, 894-95
(2006).
60. See LISA WALKER, LOOKING LIKE WHAT YOU ARE: SEXUAL STYLE, RACE, AND LESBIAN
IDENTITY 183-84 (2001).
61. See Yoshino, supra note 16, at 844.
62. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 59, at 896.
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Closet, Professor Rose Cuison Villazor examines the ways in which
the closet metaphor and coming-out narrative may provide useful
templates for those who seek to advocate for immigrants’ rights,
including a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants.63 This
Article builds upon Professor Villazor’s work to further explore how
legal regulation of immigrants’ lives, through federal, state, and
local laws and regulations, contributes to the pressure upon some
immigrants to pass as either U.S. citizens or LPRs. This mandatory
immigration status passing is particularly salient in the context of
undocumented migration and unauthorized employment. As the
discussion in Part II.B will show, for some categories of migrants,
passing is coerced because it is necessary to conceal formal immigra-
tion status in order to enjoy a basic quotidian existence—to seek
employment, to attend school, to drive a vehicle, or to access health-
care services. Once again, this illustrates the normative ambiguity
of passing as a form of assimilation. Passing can create otherwise
unattainable opportunities for immigrants. But, the very fact that
it is necessary for those immigrants to pass as something that they
are not in order to attain those opportunities underscores just how
dire their situations are under current U.S. law.
C. Covering
“Covering,” as described by Professor Yoshino, involves “ton[ing]
down a disfavored identity to fit into the mainstream.”64 Unlike
conversion, there is no fundamental alteration to the individual’s
underlying, traditionally disfavored characteristic.65 Unlike passing,
the individual does not actively conceal the minority identity trait
and makes no claim to belong to a different racial, ethnic, religious,
or other group.66 Instead, the person covering downplays their “oth-
erness” to enable those around her to disattend to that aspect of her
identity.67 In so doing, the person covering allows the members of
63. See Villazor, supra note 27, at 72.
64. YOSHINO, supra note 16, at ix.
65. See Yoshino, supra note 16, at 772.
66. See id.
67. See id.
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the majority group to feel at ease, rather than being challenged or
discomfited by nonmajoritarian traits or behaviors.68
Professor Yoshino identifies four ways in which people may cov-
er. First, they may cover with respect to their outward appearance.69
For example, an African American woman who would wear braids
or cornrows in other environments may avoid doing so in the
workplace,70 or an “out” gay man, who is ordinarily gender-
nonconforming, might conform to traditional gender norms when
with his extended family. Second, people may cover with respect to
affiliation.71 This might include LGBTQ people immersing them-
selves in “straight-focused,” as opposed to “gay-focused” culture, or
avoiding predominantly gay social settings such as clubs or bars.72
Third, people may cover with respect to activism.73 Young Muslim
professors may avoid engaging in scholarship involving Islam, even
if it is a topic about which they are passionate,74 or female board
members may refrain from critiquing their organization’s pregnancy
and maternity leave policies, even if they disagree with them.
Fourth and finally, people may cover with respect to association.75
For same-sex couples this may involve avoiding public displays of
affection or other overt signaling of their relationship status.76 In
each of these instances, the societally disfavored characteristic—
whether racial identity, sexual orientation, religious commitment,
sex, or gender—remains an acknowledged part of the covering
individual’s identity. But, the difference or “otherness” is downplay-
ed by the persons covering to make it less salient to the majority
culture around them and, as a consequence, to make themselves
more palatable or acceptable to the mainstream. As with passing,
covering may facilitate the inclusion of those who would otherwise
be marginalized. It may lead to professional and personal success
that would not otherwise be attainable, given the prevalence of
discrimination against minority groups and individuals. However,
68. Cf. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 59, at 894-95.
69. See YOSHINO, supra note 16, at 79-82.
70. Cf. Yoshino, supra note 16, at 890.
71. See YOSHINO, supra note 16, at 82-84.
72. Cf. Yoshino, supra note 16, at 845.
73. See YOSHINO, supra note 16, at 85-89.
74. Cf. Yoshino, supra note 16, at 846.
75. See YOSHINO, supra note 16, at 89-91.
76. See Yoshino, supra note 16, at 843.
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Professor Yoshino and others argue convincingly that there is po-
tentially a high cost to pay for acceding to pressures to conform to
majority norms.77 For this reason, Professor Yoshino argues that
covering constitutes a “hidden assault” on civil rights.78
Cultural or social covering by immigrants has a long tradition
in the United States. Bilingual immigrants who care deeply about
their mother tongue may nonetheless choose to communicate pre-
dominantly in American English, rather than in Spanish, Haitian
Creole, Arabic, or Tagalog.79 Newly arrived migrants, concerned
about acceptance by their neighbors, may choose to display the stars
and stripes in their workplaces and homes, even if they feel am-
bivalent about the symbol.80 Long-term residents, wary of appearing
“foreign,” may forsake their traditional national dress.81 LPRs may
ally themselves with American-born U.S. citizens opposed to
undocumented migration in order to distance themselves from
others whom they believe are perceived to be “undesirable.”82 In all
of these ways, and more, individuals from different countries of
origin may take steps to downplay any differences created by their
national origin and assimilate into the sociocultural mainstream. 
The relatively recent phenomenon of “DREAMers,” young un-
documented immigrants who entered the United States as minor
children and who have been raised exclusively in this country,83
77. See YOSHINO, supra note 16, at xi.
78. Id.
79. See Alba, supra note 47 (discussing the prevalence of English language among bi-
lingual immigrants).
80. See Jackleen M. Salem, Arabs and Arab Americans, 1940-Present, in 2 IMMIGRANTS
IN AMERICAN HISTORY: ARRIVAL, ADAPTATION, AND INTEGRATION 713, 719-20 (Elliott Robert
Barkan ed., 2013).
81. See Anny Bakalian & Mehdi Bozorgmehr, Middle Eastern and North African
Immigrants and Middle Eastern and North African Americans, 1940-Present, in 3 IMMIGRANTS
IN AMERICAN HISTORY: ARRIVAL, ADAPTATION, AND INTEGRATION, supra note 80, at 1135, 1142.
82. See Rudy P. Guevarra Jr., Mexicans and Mexican Americans, 1940-Present, in 3
IMMIGRANTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY: ARRIVAL, ADAPTATION, AND INTEGRATION, supra note 80,
at 1119, 1122.
83. See Elizabeth Keyes, Defining American: The DREAM Act, Immigration Reform and
Citizenship, 14 NEV. L.J. 101, 103 (2013) (describing the term “DREAMers”). Over the last
decade, a number of bills for the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors
(DREAM) Act have been presented to Congress seeking to provide undocumented high school
students with a potential path to legal status in the United States. See, e.g., American Dream
Act, H.R. 1751, 111th Cong. §§ 3-4 (2009); American Dream Act, H.R. 1275, 110th Cong. §§ 3-4
(2007); DREAM Act of 2005, S. 2075, 109th Cong. §§ 3-4 (2005); DREAM Act of 2003, S. 1545,
108th Cong. §§ 3-4 (2003); DREAM Act, S. 1291, 107th Cong. §§ 2-3 (2001).
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poses a unique challenge to our understanding of sociocultural
covering of immigrant identity. These young people are “out” as both
immigrants and as lacking in formal legal status, two facts that
they are open about with their family, friends, acquaintances, and,
in many cases, the federal government.84 Indeed, speaking out in
public about undocumented status is a key element of self-identifi-
cation as a DREAMer.85 There is no suggestion, therefore, that
DREAMers are attempting to pass as something that they are not.
Yet, at the same time, they appear in many respects to be seamless-
ly assimilated into the cultural mainstream. For these young
“undocumented Americans,” the line is blurred between any
consciously Americanized covering or public presentation and their
authentic selves.86 Indeed, they have proven to be a powerful voice
for political change precisely because of their widely perceived
“Americanness.”
However, the focus of this Article is not on the sociocultural
experience of covering by different immigrant groups. Rather, the
Article attempts to illuminate the ways in which federal, state, and
local laws and regulations function in practice to facilitate immi-
grant covering. As the discussion in Part II.C will show, in the
absence of comprehensive immigration reform at the federal level
that would allow status conversion by large numbers of immigrants,
and in the face of increased state and federal enforcement and other
initiatives pressuring immigrants to pass as holders of different
statuses, a variety of initiatives in recent years have sought to elide
formal immigration status-based distinctions to enable otherwise-
marginalized immigrants to blend into the mainstream. This im-
migration status covering, whether authorized by operation of
federal, state, or local law, has many guises. But in each instance,
84. See Keyes, supra note 83, at 110-11.
85. See id. at 103.
86. Cf. id. at 123 (discussing immigrants as “Americans in waiting”); Dulce Paloma
Baltazar Pedraza, Alumna Works to Pass the DREAM Act, ST. PRESS (Sept. 26, 2012, 5:14
PM), http://www.statepress.com/article/2012/09/alumna-works-to-pass-the-dream-act [https://
perma.cc/4M8M-UFE8] (discussing a Mexican immigrant describing herself as “an American
without papers” and a “DREAMer”); Jose Antonio Vargas, What Would You Ask an Undocu-
mented Immigrant?, HUFFINGTON POST (June 2, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jose-
antonio-vargas/jose-antonio-vargas-facebook-chat_b_2997232.html [https://perma.cc/7WZZ-
PL7U] (discussing an undocumented Filipino immigrant describing himself as “an American
without papers”).
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the purpose, and to some extent effect, is to minimize the differences
created by immigration status, fostering disattention to that aspect
of an individual’s identity. As the discussion below will demonstrate,
many of these initiatives are intended to benefit, rather than harm,
immigrants. But, as with sociocultural covering of immigrant identi-
ty, or covering on the basis of race, religion, sex, gender, or sexual
orientation, immigration status covering is a form of assimilation
that does not per se benefit or harm an individual. It can have
either effect, and sometimes can even have both, as the discussion
below will demonstrate.
II. IMMIGRANT COVERING
This Part explores the ways in which federal, state, and local
statutes and regulations relating to immigration and alienage
currently affect different immigrants’ rights to live and work in the
United States. It uses the covering paradigm, outlined in Part I, to
shed light on the ways in which these laws function in theory and
in practice to either facilitate or constrain immigrant assimilation.
A. Immigration Status Conversion
Formal immigration status is one of the very few areas where
true “conversion” from one state to another is possible to achieve.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, as amended,
provides for several different categories of immigration status,
including, most notably, U.S. citizen, LPR, refugee or asylee, non-
immigrant visa holder, and undocumented immigrant.87 The same
federal statute sets forth several mechanisms through which
immigrant residents in the United States may alter their immigra-
tion status.88 An LPR who fulfills certain criteria may apply for
naturalization as a United States citizen.89 In so doing, she effec-
tively changes her formal legal status from member of the immi-
grant “out-group” to member of the citizen “in-group.” An immigrant
living in the United States on a temporary visa—somewhat
87. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified
as amended in scattered section of 8 U.S.C.).
88. See id.
89. 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (2012).
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confusingly referred to as a “nonimmigrant” in the statute—may, in
some circumstances, adjust his status to that of an LPR.90 Through
that adjustment, he moves from the tenuousness of temporary
residence to the right to permanently live and work in the United
States.91 An undocumented immigrant may even, in extraordinarily
rare circumstances, adjust status to that of nonimmigrant visa
holder or LPR.92 Through this process, she moves from a precarious
position on the margins of mainstream American society and takes
one step closer to full assimilation. The diagram below, composed of
concentric circles, provides a very simple illustration of these
different levels of assimilation into the mainstream.93
90. Id. § 1255.
91. See id.; Rights and Responsibilities of a Green Card Holder (Permanent Resident), U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (July 15, 2015), https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/after-green-
card-granted/rights-and-responsibilities-permanent-resident/rights-and-responsibilities-green-
card-holder-permanent-resident [https://perma.cc/SGL3-TFUW].
92. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (providing requirements for adjustment of status based on
marriage to a U.S. citizen); id. § 1158 (providing requirements for adjustment of status based
on asylum); id. § 1255 (providing requirements for adjustment of status for various
nonimmigrant visa holders).
93. Professor David Martin offers a slightly different hierarchy of migrant assimilation.
See David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The Real
Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 92 (ranking the hierarchy of immigrants
in order of decreasing community membership as follows: (1) citizens, (2) LPRs, (3) admitted
nonimmigrants, (4) entrants without inspection, (5) parolees, and (6) applicants at the border);
see also Geoffrey Heeren, Persons Who Are Not the People: The Changing Rights of
Immigrants in the United States, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 367, 374 (2013) (“Today non-
citizens are balkanized into a host of hierarchical categories.”).
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Figure 1.
These circles show the different possible stages of “conversion” of
status, reaching from the undocumented immigrants on the margins
of society, to the United States citizens who occupy the fully as-
similated center. Each of the potential alterations of status and
identity, represented by a move from the outer fringes of the dia-
gram to its center, are widely regarded as desirable, affording some
additional rights and privileges to the migrant.94
This Part discusses the processes of immigrant status conversion
enshrined in federal law and influenced by state law—local and
municipal laws, to the chagrin of many local lawmakers, have no
94. For example, the move from nonimmigrant visa holder to LPR accords the immigrant
important new, albeit limited, due process and constitutional rights. See, e.g., Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-33 (1982) (granting full constitutional due process rights to LPRs
when threatened with deportation); Rafeedie v. INS, 795 F. Supp. 13, 22 (D.D.C. 1992)
(finding the plaintiff, an LPR, was “entitled to the same First Amendment protections as
United States citizens”).
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effect on immigration status conversion. At the federal level, the
Article discusses naturalization, as well as adjustment of status
from refugee or asylee status, from nonimmigrant visa holder
status, or from undocumented status to lawful permanent residen-
cy, and from undocumented migrant to temporary nonimmigrant
visa holder. At the state level, the Article explores the limited role
that state laws play in establishing the predicate requirements for
adjustment of status—whether through marriage, adoption, or state
court orders facilitating special immigrant juvenile status. In each
instance, as the discussion that follows will show, status conversion
has the potential to accelerate or facilitate immigrant assimilation
into mainstream American society.
1. Full Conversion Under Federal Law
[Having a green card] wasn’t enough for me.... I believe strongly
in the Constitution of this country and just having the right to
work here wasn’t enough. I wanted the right to vote and I wanted
the right to call myself American. 
Stephen Park, naturalized U.S. citizen, Georgia95
I came to the US on the Iraqi Young Leaders Exchange Pro-
gram.... [M]y visa was for 1 month.... Now my village was taken
[sic] over by ISIS and they are killing people for their religious
beliefs and thousands of the young girls are now taken as sex
slaves. So I applied for asylum in US [sic] before my visa expired
and I did my interview 2 months ago. Now I’m just waiting for
the letter to come and if they say yes then I’m safe here. If not
then I might have to go back and I could be killed there. 
Azswan, asylum applicant, Oregon96
Immigration status conversion, as set forth in the INA, is the
almost-exclusive prerogative of the federal government.97 The most
complete form of immigrant conversion and assimilation into the
95. Rachel Rodriguez, Naturalized Citizens Explain Why They’re American by Choice,
CNN (July 4, 2012, 10:09 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/04/us/naturalized-american-
citizens-ireport [https://perma.cc/5TVK-AAEP].
96. MY IMMIGR. STORY, https://myimmigrationstory.com [https://perma.cc/EJ4D-L7JM].
97. Karl Manheim, State Immigration Laws and Federal Supremacy, 22 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 939, 943 (1995) (describing the nature of federal supremacy in immigration matters).
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mainstream of American society is represented by the acquisition of
United States citizenship.98 Under the current naturalization
requirements set forth in the INA, an immigrant must meet a
number of criteria before she can become a U.S. citizen. She must
first live in the United States for five years as an LPR,99 but this
period is reduced to three years for individuals who obtain lawful
permanent residence through marriage to a United States citizen.100
Such residence must be “continuous”; in other words, there must not
be a continuous absence of six months or more.101 The would-be
citizen must have “good moral character,” an opaque phrase that
signifies that she has no disqualifying criminal history in the years
preceding naturalization.102 In addition, she must prove her “at-
tachment to the principles of the Constitution” of the United States
by agreeing to recite an oath of allegiance.103 Further she must
demonstrate, at an interview with an officer of the United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services, that she can understand,
speak, read, and write English,104 and that she has sufficient
knowledge and understanding of the fundamentals of U.S. history
and principles of government, according to the terms of the U.S.
citizenship test.105 Once the aspiring citizen has met all of these
prerequisites, she is invited to attend a ceremony, at which she
recites the oath of allegiance and receives her certificate of natural-
ization.106
At the conclusion of the oath ceremony, the immigrant has been
fully converted to a citizen—at least with respect to her formal legal
status.107 She is no longer subject to the strictures and controls of
98. See Martin, supra note 93, at 92 (“[C]itizens occupy the highest rung of the community
membership ladder.”).
99. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2012).
100. Id. § 1430(a).
101. Id. § 1427(a)-(b).
102. Id. § 1427(d); see 8 C.F.R. § 316.10 (2016).
103. 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a).
104. Id. § 1423(a)(1).
105. Id. § 1423(a)(2); see 8 C.F.R. § 245a.3(b)(4)(iii)(A)(2).
106. 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a).
107. Of course, formal legal status is just one dimension of citizenship. See, e.g., LINDA
BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 18-20
(2006) (describing citizenship as formal legal status, citizenship as the enjoyment of a
particular bundle of rights and benefits, citizenship as political participation, and citizenship
as social and identity membership). 
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myriad immigration laws: she does not face deportation if she
commits a crime,108 she no longer has any restrictions on her ability
to seek employment,109 she is eligible for public services and ben-
efits,110 she may vote,111 and she may serve on a jury.112 Her identity
as an immigrant has been fundamentally changed, and now she is
a citizen, a fact that is celebrated in various ways by her new
government.113
LPRs occupy a middle ground between fully assimilated U.S.
citizens and migrants on temporary visas. LPRs have been granted
an “immigrant visa,” which gives them authorization by the federal
government to live permanently in the United States.114 LPRs enjoy
many, but not all, of the rights of U.S. citizens. LPRs have authori-
zation to work in the United States—although they are barred from
certain government positions for which only citizens are eligible.115
LPRs are eligible for some, but not all, government benefits.116 They
can freely travel to and from the United States, although they may
be barred from entering the country if United States Customs and
Border Protection officials have reason to believe that they have
violated the terms of their immigrant visa in some way either before
leaving the country or while abroad.117 They also enjoy generally
greater, but far from absolute, protection from deportation under
108. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (applying deportation sanctions for criminal offenses only to
“aliens”).
109. See id. § 1182(a)(5) (limiting the fields in which an “alien” may work).
110. See id. §1613, 1621 (limiting the accessibility of public benefits to “aliens”).
111. See 18 U.S.C. § 611 (2012) (limiting the right of noncitizens to vote in federal
elections).
112. See 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (2012) (limiting the right to sit on juries to citizens).
113. See, e.g., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., M-767, IMPORTANT INFORMATION
FOR NEW CITIZENS (2012), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Office%20of%20
Citizenship/Citizenship%20Resource%20Center%20Site/Publications/PDFs/M-767.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4HB4-R5EV].
114. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)-(16) (defining “immigrant” and “immigrant visa”). 
115. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 444-47 (1982) (discussing permissible
employment restrictions on LPRs).
116. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(B)(i) (exempting LPRs from ban against immigrants
receiving federal benefits). But see TANYA BRODER ET AL., NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., OVER-
VIEW OF IMMIGRANT ELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERAL PROGRAMS 1 (2015), https://www.nilc.org/ wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/overview-immeligfedprograms-2015-12-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/
M4VE-CQ9L] (noting that modern welfare and immigration laws created unprecedented
restrictions for LPR access to federal public benefits).
117. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) (explaining that LPRs with criminal convictions
returning from abroad may not reenter the country).
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immigration law than do noncitizen immigrants without LPR sta-
tus,118 as well as certain due process protections in nonimmigration
court proceedings.119 They can petition the federal government for
certain family members to join them in the United States, although
they are a lower priority than the family members of U.S. citizens
and thus typically must endure a longer wait.120 Finally, after five
years of lawful permanent residence—or three years in the case of
an individual married to a U.S. citizen121—LPRs are eligible to apply
for naturalization.122 In short, they enjoy a reasonable degree of
assimilation into mainstream American society.
There are several different routes to become an LPR. Many LPRs
in the United States obtain that status because they are sponsored
by a family member who is a U.S. citizen or an LPR themselves.123
Others are sponsored by an employer.124 Others enter through the
“diversity” program,125 which is sometimes called the “green card
lottery.”126 Others originally enter the United States as refugees or
asylum seekers and subsequently adjust status to become LPRs.127
There are also a variety of humanitarian programs that enable
certain undocumented immigrants or immigrants in the United
118. See id. § 1229b(a) (explaining cancellation of removal for certain LPRs).
119. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-33 (1982) (granting full constitutional due
process rights to LPRs as to their admission).
120. See Family of Green Card Holders (Permanent Residents), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVS. (July 14, 2015), https://www.uscis.gov/family/family-green-card-holders-permanent-
residents [https://perma.cc/KPX5-7HA2] (describing petition procedure for entry of LPRs’
family members); Visa Availability and Priority Dates, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.
(Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-processes-and-procedures/visa-
availability-and-priority-dates [https://perma.cc/E8XK-6YW4] (noting that family-sponsored
immigrant visas are numerically limited).
121. See 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a).
122. See id. § 1427(a).
123. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (laying out numerical allotment of visas); Green Card Eligibil-
ity, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Mar. 30, 2011), https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/
green-card-processes-and-procedures/green-card-eligibility [https://perma.cc/YF88-VUAD].
124. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b).
125. See id. § 1153(c).
126. See Jie Zong & Jeanne Batalova, Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and
Immigration in the United States, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.
migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-and-immigration-
united-states [https://perma.cc/PP4W-C2FK] (referring to the § 1153(c) program as the
“Diversity Visa Lottery,” “the DV lottery,” and “the green-card lottery”).
127. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157-1159 (governing admission and adjustment of status for refugees
and asylum-seekers).
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States on temporary visas to file applications to become LPRs with-
out family or employer sponsorship.128 An individual can enter the
United States as an LPR by crossing the border in possession of a
valid immigrant visa.129 In that case, federal immigration law has
converted her legal status from that of nonresident alien to LPR
upon her arrival in the United States. Alternatively, she can enter
the country on a temporary nonimmigrant visa as a refugee or even
without inspection at the border and subsequently convert her
status using the formal mechanism of adjustment of status while
she resides in the United States.130 As with naturalization, this
conversion by adjustment of status or issuance of the immigrant
visa fundamentally changes the immigrant’s position in the eyes of
the law.131 She moves from being an outsider with very few rights to
being more of an insider, enjoying a variety of privileges and
protections.
Despite the term “lawful permanent resident,” conversion from
nonimmigrant, nonresident alien, or undocumented immigrant to
LPR is not necessarily permanent. The somewhat oxymoronic status
of “conditional lawful permanent resident” applies to certain cat-
egories of immigrants, most notably those who obtain green cards
on the basis of a marriage of short duration to a United States cit-
izen.132 At the end of a set period, most commonly two years, holders
of that status must apply for “permanent” permanent residence—a
process that involves paying more fees, submitting more documen-
tary evidence, and, in some circumstances, attending additional
interviews with immigration officials.133 Failure to do so results not
only in a denial of long-term permanent residency, but also a
128. See, e.g., Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40701-
40703, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902-55 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2012))
(outlining the procedures that “aliens” may use to self-petition for relief); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11
(2016) (describing application process for specialized visas); Green Card Eligibility, supra note
123.
129. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (listing the “alien” groups that may be admitted to the United
States with immigrant visas).
130. See id. § 1255 (adjustment of status of nonimmigrant to that of person admitted for
permanent residence).
131. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-33 (1982) (granting constitutional due
process rights to LPRs as to their admission status).
132. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a.
133. See id. § 1186a(c); see also H.R. REP. NO. 99-906, at 7 (1986), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5978, 5979 (explaining the petition process for permanent residency).
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revocation of conditional permanent resident status itself.134
Moreover, even those who obtain unconditional permanent resi-
dence, which is presumptively indefinite, could lose that status and
be placed in removal (colloquially called deportation) proceedings at
any time if they engage in behavior that violates the terms of their
immigrant visa.135 This may occur when an LPR commits a crime
(even a crime that would be considered of minor importance if
committed by a citizen),136 is suspected of ties to a terrorist organiza-
tion,137 becomes a “public charge,”138 or is found to have provided
false information to obtain the immigrant visa in the first place.139
Therefore, LPR status provides no fixed guarantee of permanent
and complete assimilation into the U.S. polity. Rather, it represents
a broad, but incomplete, degree of assimilation into mainstream
society that is inherently fragile and unstable.
However, because LPR status offers greater opportunities for
assimilation and greater security than any other immigration
status,140 refugees and asylum seekers, nonimmigrant visa holders,
and undocumented immigrants aspire to achieve LPR status. In
many respects, refugees and individuals granted asylum (unlike
nonimmigrant visa holders and undocumented migrants) might be
regarded as “LPRs in waiting.” In order to obtain refugee or asylee
status, an immigrant must demonstrate to the satisfaction of an
immigration official that she has experienced past persecution or
has a well-founded fear of future persecution in her country of origin
on account of her race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or
membership in a particular social group.141 Once the immigration
official determines that she has a valid claim for asylum, she is
authorized to work in the United States, is eligible for some public
benefits, and may, after one year’s residence in the United States,
apply to become an LPR.142 Thus, for refugees and asylees, the
possibility for conversion of status, first from temporary status to
134. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(2).
135. See id. § 1227(a)(2)-(6).
136. See id. § 1227(a)(2) (outlining various criminal grounds of removal).
137. See id. § 1227(a)(4).
138. See id. § 1227(a)(5).
139. See id. § 1227(a)(3)(B).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 114-22.
141. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157-1159.
142. See id. § 1227(a)(4).
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LPR status and then from LPR status to citizen, is clearly mapped
out.
In contrast, no such clear set path to formal status conversion
exists for nonimmigrant visa holders or undocumented immigrants.
Currently, there are approximately two million nonimmigrant visa
holders in the United States.143 A temporary nonimmigrant visa
may be issued in a variety of circumstances, most commonly to
tourists and individuals taking business trips,144 diplomats of other
nations or employees of international organizations,145 foreign media
correspondents,146 investors,147 students,148 temporary workers,149
fiancées of United States citizens,150 intracompany transferees
within large multinational corporations,151 aliens of “extraordinary
ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics,”152
religious workers,153 individuals who can provide “essential” assis-
tance to U.S. law enforcement in a criminal or terrorism-related
investigation,154 victims of human trafficking to the United States,155
and victims of crime in the United States.156 The majority of
nonimmigrant visa holders have no route from their nonimmigrant
status to LPR status, unless they have a close family relationship
with a U.S. citizen that enables them to apply for adjustment of
status on that basis while their nonimmigrant visa is still current.157
For example, a student admitted on a nonimmigrant student visa
may meet and marry a U.S. citizen during his course of studies
143. See Zong & Batalova, supra note 126 (“[A]s of January 1, 2012, about 1.9 million
foreign nationals on various temporary visas resided in the United States.” (footnote
omitted)).
144. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(B).
145. Id. § 1101(a)(15)(A), (G).
146. Id. § 1101(a)(15)(I).
147. Id. § 1101(a)(15)(E).
148. Id. § 1101(a)(15)(F), (J), (M).
149. Id. § 1101(a)(15)(H).
150. Id. § 1101(a)(15)(K).
151. Id. § 1101(a)(15)(L).
152. Id. § 1101(a)(15)(O).
153. Id. § 1101(a)(15)(R).
154. Id. § 1101(a)(15)(S).
155. Id. § 1101(a)(15)(T).
156. Id. § 1101(a)(15)(U).
157. Cf. id. § 1255 (explaining the ways in which nonimmigrants may get their status
changed).
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and then apply to adjust status to become an LPR on the basis that
he is now the immediate relative of a U.S. citizen.
Nonimmigrant visas are, by their very nature, temporary. For the
duration of his nonimmigrant visa’s validity, a nonimmigrant visa
holder remains in the United States at the federal government’s
pleasure.158 His visa may be revoked at any time if he breaks any of
its conditions—for example, if he works without prior authorization
from the federal government or if he commits almost any crime.159
In some circumstances, a nonimmigrant visa may be revoked if the
federal government decides to remove certain categories of non-
immigrants from the United States for some other reason. For
example, during the Iranian hostage crisis in 1980, the U.S. govern-
ment revoked the nonimmigrant visas of all Iranians present in the
United States.160 In short, nonimmigrant status is contingent and
lacks long-term security, which is why conversion from nonim-
migrant to LPR status is so attractive.
Undocumented immigrants are in an even more tenuous position
than nonimmigrant visa holders. There are a variety of circum-
stances in which an immigrant may be present in the United States
without formal authorization. For example, an immigrant may en-
ter the United States on a nonimmigrant visa—such as a tourist
visa or a temporary worker visa—and then not leave the country
when the visa expires.161 Or, she may enter the United States on a
nonimmigrant visa and violate the terms of her visa, causing her to
fall out of status and be ordered removed from the United States,162
but she may nonetheless evade removal and remain without autho-
rization. Or, she may enter the United States, apply unsuccessfully
for asylum and be issued a removal order,163 but nonetheless stay in
the country. Or, she may enter the country illegally, by crossing the
158. See 22 C.F.R. § 41.122(a) (2016) (stating the discretionary revocation of visas).
159. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227.
160. See PUB. AFFAIRS ALL. OF IRANIAN AMS., IRANIAN AMERICANS: IMMIGRATION AND
ASSIMILATION 6 (2014), http://www.paaia.org/CMS/Data/Sites/1/pdfs/iranian-americans---
immigration-and-assimilation.pdf [https://perma.cc/NKG9-GHGW].
161. See 8 U.S.C. § 1202(g).
162. See id. § 1227(a)(1)(c)(i) (“Any alien who was admitted as a nonimmigrant and who has
failed to maintain the nonimmigrant status in which the alien was admitted ... is deport-
able.”).
163. See id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I).
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border without inspection.164 For immigrants in any of these cir-
cumstances, status conversion to become either a nonimmigrant or
LPR is extremely hard to achieve.165 There has been no clear path
to status conversion for large groups of undocumented immigrants
since the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).166
IRCA permitted approximately 2.7 million undocumented immi-
grants to adjust status to become LPRs and, ultimately, citizens.167
This large-scale legalization was, however, of limited application
and limited duration. It was available only to immigrants who had
resided in the United States since 1982 and certain agricultural
workers.168 Since then, conversion from undocumented status has
been available only to a very limited number of immigrants on
humanitarian grounds.169 Today, it is available only if the undocu-
mented immigrant has resided in the United States for an extended
period of time, has committed no disqualifying crimes, and has
family ties to U.S. citizens who would suffer exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship if the undocumented immigrant were
to be deported,170 or if the undocumented immigrant herself has
been the victim of domestic abuse, trafficking, or some other crime
in the United States.171
In recent years, there have been several failed attempts at
introducing comprehensive immigration reform.172 Each of these
164. See id. § 1325.
165. See, e.g., id. § 1182 (explaining that “aliens” overstaying their visas are inadmissible).
166. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2012)); see also DONALD M.
KERWIN & LAUREEN LAGLAGARON, MIGRATION POLICY INST., STRUCTURING AND IMPLEMENTING
AN IMMIGRANT LEGALIZATION PROGRAM: REGISTRATION AS THE FIRST STEP 1 (2010), http://www.
migrationpolicy.org/pubs/legalization-registration.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SZZ-AEXU] (noting
that IRCA has been the only “general” legalization program).
167. KERWIN & LAGLAGARON, supra note 166, at 32.
168. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1160, 1255a.
169. For example, in the 1990s, individuals from Nicaragua, Cuba, Guatemala, El
Salvador, and former Soviet bloc countries became eligible to apply for “special rule”
cancellation of removal under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act
(NACARA). See generally Eli Coffino, Note, A Long Road to Residency: The Legal History of
Salvadoran & Guatemalan Immigration to the United States with a Focus on NACARA, 14
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 177 (2006).
170. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).
171. See id § 1229b(b)(2).
172. See, e.g., Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act,
S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013); Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th
Cong. (2006); Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005,
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failed bills would have broadened opportunities for access to status
conversion at all levels—undocumented migrant to nonimmigrant
or LPR, nonimmigrant to LPR, and LPR to citizen. In each in-
stance, the failure to enact meaningful reform can be attributed to
vehement opposition to the possibility of status conversion for un-
documented immigrants.173
2. Partial Conversion Under State Law
I am 19 years old, I was born in Reynosa[,] Mexico ... I have lived
here in the United States since [I was] really little and when I
was like 10 I got taken away from my mother in the state of
Arkansas by the Foster care program. At age 16 I started to act
up and I never got adopted so I kept running away until now I’m
19 still with no papers. I have twin boys born in the United
States and [living] with my boyfriend. I want to get married and
have him apply for me but I’m scared things are going to go
wrong.
Gloria, undocumented immigrant, Texas174
He’ll never have to go back to a country that will kill him.
Nick Marritz, Attorney for Guillermo, recipient of Special
Immigrant Juvenile Status, Virginia175
In June 2012, in its landmark ruling in Arizona v. United States,
the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed that the federal
government had “broad, undoubted power” over immigration regula-
tion.176 The Court emphasized that, with respect to immigration
powers, the federal government was a “single sovereign” at the head
of “a comprehensive and unified system.”177 The federal govern-
ment’s plenary power in the immigration arena thus leaves very
H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. (2005).
173. See Jeffrey N. Poulin, Current Development, The Piecemeal Approach Falls Short of
Achieving the DREAM of Immigration Reform, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 353, 355-56 (2008).
174. Older Stories, MY IMMIGR. STORY, https://myimmigrationstory.com/older-stories/
[https://perma.cc/2QAD-27Z2].
175. J. Weston Phippen, Young, Illegal, and Alone, ATLANTIC (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.
theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/10/unaccompanied-minors-immigrants/410404/
[https://perma.cc/6BTF-63AD].
176. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012).
177. Id. at 2502.
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little room for other governmental actors to affect conversion of
formal immigration status in any way. Indeed, local governments
and their laws and regulations play no role whatsoever in formal
immigration status conversion.178 Similarly, as a general rule, state
governments and state laws have no influence on immigration
status conversion—to the chagrin of both immigrants’ advocates and
their opponents.179
The only (limited) exception to this rule occurs when the validity
of a predicate condition for conversion by operation of federal law is
dependent upon a prior determination made under color of state
law. In this respect, the process of status conversion begins with an
action performed by, or with the acquiescence of, the state in which
the action occurs. A straightforward example of such an action
would be when a nonimmigrant or undocumented immigrant seeks
to adjust status on the basis of marriage to a U.S. citizen or an LPR.
That marriage must be one that is recognized under the law of the
state in which the marriage occurs.180 The marriage certificate
issued by the state is then necessary, but not sufficient, for the
process of status conversion by the federal government. A state’s
certification of the valid adoption of a minor child functions in much
the same way: that adoption forms the basis for subsequent con-
version of the child’s formal immigration status.181
A more complex example of the state playing a partial role in
immigration status conversion occurs when an immigrant under the
age of twenty-one seeks Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS).
Congress created the SIJS immigration classification in 1990 to
protect abused, neglected, or abandoned immigrant children.182 Any
child present in the United States who is not a U.S. citizen or an
178. See id. (explaining that when the federal government “occupies an entire field, as it
has in the field of alien registration,” any state regulation in that area is impermissible).
179. See id. (noting that even complementary or parallel state regulation is impermissible).
180. See Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. 746, 751 (B.I.A. 2005) (holding that although “the
ultimate issue of the validity of a marriage for immigration purposes is one of Federal law,
that law has, from the inception of our nation, recognized that the regulation of marriage is
almost exclusively a State matter”).
181. See Richard R. Carlson, Transnational Adoption of Children, 23 TULSA L.J. 317, 319
(1988) (noting that federal immigration officials must “be concerned with state standards,
because a state court ultimately will decide whether [an] adoption should be granted under
state law”).
182. See RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43703, SPECIAL IMMIGRANT
JUVENILES: IN BRIEF 1 (2014).
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LPR may be eligible to apply for SIJS if they are (1) under twenty-
one years of age; (2) unmarried; (3) present in the United States;
and (4) subject to a valid state court order with three specific
findings.183 First, the state court must find that reunification with
one or more parent is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandon-
ment, or a similar reason under state law.184 Second, the state court
must find that the child or young person is a dependent of the court,
a state agency, or another court-appointed individual.185 Third and
finally, the state court must find that it is not in the best interests
of the child to return to the child’s country of origin.186 If all of the
requisite criteria are met, including that the young person is subject
to the valid state court order, a federal immigration official may
authorize a grant of SIJS.187 Once the government grants SIJS, the
child (who may be a refugee, an asylee, a nonimmigrant, or undocu-
mented) may apply to adjust his status to become an LPR.188 The
role of the state court judge in this process is crucial. Without the
state court’s determinations, status conversion is not possible. Here,
too, the process of status conversion begins with the state actor, and
once again, the state’s actions are necessary, but not sufficient, for
the immigrant to achieve status conversion. Thus, in this small way,
state law plays a partial role in the process of immigration status
conversion.189
B. Immigration Status Passing
Immigration status “passing” is a widespread phenomenon. In
addition to concealing their immigrant identity as a sociocultural
183. 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c) (2016).
184. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i) (2012).
185. See id.
186. See id. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(ii).
187. 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(b), (e).
188. See WASEM, supra note 182, at 4. One-step processing is available for children who
apply for SIJS when they are not already in immigration court proceedings. See Concurrent
Filing, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Oct. 29, 2015), https://www.uscis.gov/green-
card/green-card-processes-and-procedures/concurrent-filing [https://perma.cc/G7GT-R56E].
189. For more information about the importance of prior state court rulings on the federal
government’s immigration determinations, see generally ANGIE JUNCK ET AL., IMMIGRANT
LEGAL RESEARCH CTR., IMMIGRATION BENCHBOOK FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES
(2010), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/2010_sijs_benchbook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J82W-DVYB].
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act of passing, immigrants may pass with respect to their formal
immigration status in a variety of different contexts, including in
the workplace, at school, with government employees, and within
their own social circle. Immigrants holding various immigration
statuses may pass as U.S. citizens. Nonimmigrant visa holders and
undocumented immigrants may pass as LPRs. Undocumented
workers may pass as nonimmigrants in possession of valid work
authorization. Immigration status passing may also have a variety
of different guises. Passing may involve remaining silent about
status, leading others to assume a more favorable status. It may
involve actively lying to others. It may even involve providing false
documentation to employers, schools, and police officers. Indeed, a
thriving subeconomy exists, wherein, for the right price, counterfeit
identity documents—such as social security cards, work permits,
and driver’s licenses—can be obtained to enable individuals to pass
as members of a more favored group.190
Unlike immigration status conversion, immigration law does not
provide any mechanisms for immigrants to pass as holders of a
different immigration status. To the contrary, such passing is strict-
ly prohibited. It is an offense under federal law for a noncitizen to
claim to be a U.S. citizen.191 It is an offense under both federal and
state laws to possess or to use false identity documents, whether
wholly fabricated or in another person’s name.192 It is an immigra-
tion infraction and visa violation to work without authorization.193
Every day, nonetheless, despite the risks of immigration removal
and criminal charges, immigrants living in the United States make
the decision to pass as members of a status group to which they do
190. See John Leland, Some ID Theft Is Not for Profit, but to Get a Job, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
4, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/04/us/04theft.html [https://perma.cc/UD7J-8J57]
(describing how illegal immigrants’ use of fraudulent social security numbers “provides the
backbone of some low-wage businesses and a boon to the Social Security trust fund”).
191. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I).
192. See, e.g., id. § 1324c(a) (penalizing the use of fraudulent documents to satisfy the
IRCA’s verification requirements); 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (2012) (prohibiting the use of fraudulent
documents for entry or for employment); 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B) (2012) (prohibiting false use
of social security number); FLA. STAT. § 322.212 (2016) (making it unlawful to knowingly
possess a false or counterfeit driver’s license or identification card).
193. See Enid Trucios-Haynes, Civil Rights, Latinos, and Immigration: Cybercascades and
Other Distortions in the Immigration Reform Debate, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 637, 646-47, 653 (2006)
(noting that an unauthorized stay in the United States is a bar to permanent residence or a
temporary worker visa and is also a civil violation).
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not actually belong. The diagram below, composed of overlapping
circles, illustrates the intersection between immigrants’ underlying
identities and the identities that they may adopt in order to access
the opportunities from which they would otherwise be barred.194 As
the diagram shows, no one particular immigration status is uni-
formly adopted by immigrants seeking to pass as members of a more
assimilated group. For example, undocumented immigrants may
present themselves as either U.S. citizens, LPRs, or nonimmigrant
visa holders. Similarly, nonimmigrant visa holders may pass as
either LPRs or U.S. citizens.
Figure 2.
194. See KENNEDY, supra note 53, at 283. 
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This Section discusses the ways in which the current constellation
of federal, state, and local laws affecting the lives of immigrants
living in the United States creates conditions in which immigrant
status passing is either encouraged, implicitly tolerated, or, in some
circumstances, even required. At the federal level, this Section
discusses immigrant removal and immigrant employment
restrictions—with an emphasis on the practical divide between the
stringent laws on the books and the patchwork pattern of actual
enforcement. It demonstrates how, functionally, the limited way in
which these laws are enforced implicitly tolerates immigration sta-
tus passing. At the state level, this Section examines federal-state
enforcement agreements, state “attrition through enforcement”
initiatives, and independent state restrictions on immigrant
employment. It shows how, in states with these policies, immigra-
tion status passing is essentially required of any immigrant lacking
authorization who wishes to live and work in the state. At the local
level, this Section discusses “anti-immigrant” measures—such as so-
called Illegal Immigration Relief Acts that seek to exclude un-
documented residents from municipalities—illustrating how these
ordinances functionally force immigrants living there to pass as
holders of different immigration statuses. This Section also consid-
ers some “pro-immigrant” programs that nonetheless encourage
immigrant passing, such as “don’t ask, don’t tell” law enforcement
protocols, which put immigrants on notice that if they do not reveal
their immigration status when they come into contact with local
police, they will not have to face immigration penalties, thereby
encouraging immigration status passing.
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1. Passing Because of Federal Laws
My wife came home one day and said that she had my SSN that
she had been working on for some time. I ... utilized that SSN for
the next 24 years while I worked, built a company, employed
people, did [a] year of volunteer work, paid all of my personal
and corporate taxes fully.... Then, when getting divorced I find
out that it is NOT a good number. The person that really does
have that SSN is alive and will receive the very handsome benefit
of the taxes that I paid all those years.
Warren, Canada195
He began to work. Then they told him that there was a problem
with e-verify. That his citizenship status was not registered. So
he had to apply again. Or maybe there was an error in his social
security number. He knew that it would just fail again, because
he didn’t have a work permit. So the company said, ‘You are not
a citizen.’ And he said, ‘No.’ ‘We can’t keep you on.’
Alondra, noncitizen, California196
Two areas of federal immigration law and policy influence the
current prevalence of immigration status passing: (1) immigration
enforcement and immigrant removal, and (2) immigrant employ-
ment. The INA is unambiguous and stringent in its regulation of
both immigrants’ presence in the United States and their access to
employment. At the same time, for over twenty years, there has
been a policy of selective underenforcement by the federal govern-
ment with respect to both the removal of immigrants unlawfully
present in the United States and the regulation of the employment
of immigrants lacking work authorization.197 This creates a rath-
er contradictory situation in which the law on the books prohibits
the presence and employment of certain immigrants, but the law
as enforced allows both to proceed, provided any other implicat-
ed actors—such as employers—can plausibly deny knowledge of
the immigrants’ true immigration status.198 The result is that
195. MY IMMIGR. STORY, supra note 96.
196. ASHAR ET AL., supra note 15, at 16.
197. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 14, at 126-27.
198. For a more comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon in immigration law, see Adam
B. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the Future of Immigration Law, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 31,
31-33 (arguing that “immigration law is centrally the product of executive ‘lawmaking’ that
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immigrants in various statuses—most notably undocumented
migrants, but also nonimmigrant visa holders lacking work au-
thorization and LPRs who have in some way violated the terms of
their immigrant visas—routinely pass as holders of different im-
migration statuses.
For millions of undocumented immigrants who live in the United
States, the threat of removal from the country via deportation is
real and ever-present, even if the actual likelihood of such removal
is statistically remote. Immigrants who enter the country without
inspection at the border or who overstay their temporary nonimmi-
grant visas are subject to immigration controls and, absent other
compelling circumstances, can be arrested, detained, put in immi-
gration court proceedings, and ordered to be removed at any time.199
Nonimmigrants or LPRs who violate the terms of their visas—
whether by working without authorization, by committing one of an
enumerated list of civil immigration infractions, or by being ar-
rested for or convicted of certain federal or state crimes—may
similarly find themselves in immigration proceedings and subject to
removal.200
The immigration court system in which these removable immi-
grants may find themselves—the Executive Office of Immigration
Review within the Department of Justice—is byzantine and opaque,
so much so that the majority of immigrants who are arrested and
charged with being present in the United States without authoriza-
tion do not even contest that charge and agree to leave the country
“voluntarily” without appearing before an immigration judge.201 This
is particularly shocking because these immigrants are entitled to
participate in such a proceeding,202 which would, at the very least,
delay their removal and might even allow them to demonstrate their
eligibility for some form of relief so that they could remain in the
country. Those immigrants who do opt to appear in immigration
bears little relation to immigration law on the books”).
199. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227, 1229a, 1325(a) (2012) (explaining penalties for entry of alien
without inspection).
200. See Trucios-Haynes, supra note 193, at 653. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (outlining
classes of deportable aliens).
201. ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43892, ALIEN REMOVALS AND RETURNS:
OVERVIEW AND TRENDS 11 (2015); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1) (explaining voluntary depar-
ture).
202. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.32 (2016).
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court to contest their removal from the country frequently do so
without the benefit of legal counsel.203 As a consequence, almost all
immigrants who are charged with being unlawfully present or with
violating the terms of their visas are found by the immigration court
to be removable from the country.204 At that point, even though
there may theoretically be options available, particularly for long-
term U.S. residents,205 it is extremely difficult for an immigrant to
obtain any formal relief from removal in order to remain in the
United States. For example, it is often complicated and prohibitively
expensive to appeal an immigration court’s decision to remove an
immigrant from the country. Appeals of an immigration court’s
order of removal must be filed within thirty days with the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA), the appellate-level administrative
tribunal within the Department of Justice.206 Any subsequent
appeal of the BIA’s decision must be filed thereafter with the federal
court of appeal for the circuit in which the immigration court is
located.207 During the pendency of the federal court case, the
immigrant can still be removed from the United States unless the
circuit court specifically orders otherwise—there is no automatic
stay of removal during such proceedings.208 Moreover, even if an
immigrant does manage to file an appeal, the federal courts are
prohibited from reviewing the administrative agency’s discretionary
decisions, including any denial of relief from removal.209
203. See Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in
Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2015).
204. See id. at 76.
205. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (detailing cancellation of removal for certain nonperm-
anent residents).
206. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b), 1003.2(b)(2) (providing that orders of removal may be
appealed to the BIA).
207. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), (b)(2) (providing that the sole and exclusive means for judicial
review of an order of removal is a petition filed with an appropriate court of appeals).
208. Only two U.S. circuit courts of appeal have procedures designed to stay removal
during the pendency of proceedings. In the Ninth Circuit, the filing of a stay motion
automatically confers a temporary stay by operation of law. See De Leon v. INS, 115 F.3d 643,
644 (9th Cir. 1997); 9TH CIR. GEN. ORDER 6.4(c)(1) (2016). The Second Circuit has an informal
agreement with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS): upon notification by the court
that a stay motion has been filed, DHS will not remove the noncitizen until the court
adjudicates the stay motion. See Fatma Marouf et al., Justice on the Fly: The Danger of Errant
Deportations, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 373-74 (2014).
209. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)-(C); Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress
and the Courts: Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1624 (2000)
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The vast majority of immigrants who might find themselves in
removal proceedings likely have little awareness of the complexities
of the immigration court system. However, they do understand that
if they are arrested by the federal immigration authorities it will
likely lead to deportation.210 They therefore live in constant fear of
removal and the attendant separation from their family, friends,
community, and property.211 For many who have made their home
in the United States for years (or in some cases for decades),
deportation constitutes, as the U.S. Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged, “the equivalent of banishment or exile.”212 As a consequence,
the “possibility or threat” of removal, even in the absence of any
clear indication that such threat will be actualized against them in
the near future, creates an inexorable pressure that many immi-
grants feel the need to conceal their true immigration status and
pass as holders of a more privileged status.213
Somewhat ironically, the widespread scale upon which this
immigration status passing and the attendant violation of various
immigration laws occurs is a direct result of consecutive govern-
ments’ interpretations of those very laws. Currently, approximately
11.3 million undocumented immigrants reside in the United States,
consisting of individuals who entered the country without inspection
or overstayed their visas.214 This is far from a new phenomenon.
Historically, there have always been large numbers of unauthorized
immigrants living, working, and raising their families in the United
States.215 In large part, this situation occurs because it is just not
(explaining that the 1996 amendments eliminated federal courts’ jurisdiction to review
removal orders “predicated upon criminal convictions,” based on “discretionary remedies in
compassionate circumstances,” or entered pursuant to an “‘expedited removal’ process”).
210. See Villazor, supra note 27, at 42.
211. See id. at 31.
212. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010) (quoting Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332
U.S. 388, 390-91 (1947)). 
213. See Villazor, supra note 27, at 31 (quoting Mae M. Ngai, The Strange Career of the
Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction and Deportation Policy in the United States, 1924-1965,
21 LAW & HIST. REV. 69, 72 (2003)).
214. JEFFREY S. PASSEL ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., AS GROWTH STALLS, UNAUTHORIZED
IMMIGRANT POPULATION BECOMES MORE SETTLED 2, 4 (2014), http://www.pewhispanic.org/
files/2014/09/2014-09-03_Unauthorized-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/68QG-2HGC] (estimating
that there were 11.3 million unauthorized immigrants living in the United States in March
2013).
215. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 24-25 (2014) [hereinafter
MOTOMURA, OUTSIDE THE LAW]; HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY
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logistically feasible or economically viable to arrest, detain, impris-
on, and deport millions of people. For decades, successive Republi-
can and Democratic administrations have chosen to under-enforce
immigration laws, allowing undocumented immigrants and their
families to remain in the country.216 At the same time, alongside a
nationwide policy of condoning, or at the very least permitting, the
presence of millions of unauthorized migrants, there has been no
guarantee that any individual undocumented immigrant will not be
subject to immigration controls at any time.217 The result has been
a pattern of, at best, arbitrary and, at worst, discriminatory immi-
gration enforcement.218 This, in turn, has fostered deep uncertainty
and fear among already vulnerable immigrant communities, adding
to the pressure upon members of these communities to conceal their
true immigration status by passing.219
The main arena in which immigrants pass as holders of a
different status is the workplace. Again, this is a consequence of a
disconnect between the federal immigration enforcement laws on
the books and a widespread policy of selective underenforcement.
Unauthorized immigrants lack permission to live in the United
States and they lack access to any form of government assistance to
support themselves and their families.220 They, along with certain
nonimmigrant visa holders, also lack authorization to work in the
United States, and working without authorization is traditionally
a civil immigration violation.221 Yet, at the same time, their presence
in the country is tacitly tolerated by the authorities that choose not
OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2006).
216. See MOTOMURA, OUTSIDE THE LAW, supra note 215, at 172-74.
217. See id. at 22 (“Whether they are ultimately deported depends on countless decisions
by government officials who exercise discretion, always aware of political and economic
pressures, and often in ways that can be inconsistent, unpredictable, and sometimes
discriminatory.”).
218. See id. at 142 (explaining that discretion in immigration law is so great that it can
dismantle safeguards against arbitrary or discriminatory government decisions).
219. See Villazor, supra note 27, at 31.
220. Undocumented migrants are ineligible for food stamps, cash assistance, public
housing, social security benefits such as Supplemental Security Income and Social Security
Disability Insurance, and federally guaranteed student loans. See Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation (Welfare Reform) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 401,
110 Stat. 2105, 2261-62, (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1611 (2012)).
221. See Trucios-Haynes, supra note 193, at 653; cf. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12 (2016) (discussing
classes of aliens authorized to accept payment).
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to remove them. They are here and they must earn a living some-
how.
This inherent contradiction is addressed, to some extent, in the
laws governing the employment of immigrants lacking work auth-
orization. Employers are prohibited from hiring such individuals.222
The IRCA imposes sanctions, ranging from hefty fines to criminal
penalties, on employers who knowingly hire individuals who lack
work authorization.223 All employers are required to complete I-9
Employment Verification Forms for each employee they hire to
enable the federal government to check the immigration status of
their employees.224 Some employers, most notably federal govern-
ment contractors, are required to participate in the online E-Verify
system, which instantly compares the information on I-9 forms to
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) records.225 Workers
lacking employment authorization can only overcome these checks
and obtain employment if they successfully pass as U.S. citizens or
immigrants authorized to work. Interestingly, Congress acknowl-
edged the catch-22 in which unauthorized workers would find
themselves when developing the IRCA rules. As described above,
the IRCA imposes various sanctions on employers who hire
undocumented workers, but it does not penalize the immigrant
workers themselves.226 As the Supreme Court has noted, this
distinction in the federal Act was crucially important: “[t]he legis-
lative background of IRCA underscores the fact that Congress made
a deliberate choice not to impose criminal penalties on aliens who
seek, or engage in, unauthorized employment.”227 Thus, a “careful
balance [was] struck by Congress with respect to unauthorized
employment of aliens.”228 One of the inevitable consequences of this
“careful balance” has been the widespread prevalence of immigra-
tion status passing.
222. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a) (2012).
223. See id. §§ 1324a-1324b.
224. See id. § 1324a(b).
225. See 48 C.F.R. § 52.222-54 (2015).
226. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2504 (2012).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 2505.
808 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:765
2. Passing Because of State Laws
For as long as I can remember, I knew that my parents were
undocumented.... My parents would tell my siblings that we
wouldn’t be able to fly to see our cousins in Florida or even take
a bus to another state because they didn’t have a state-issued ID.
I have always feared my parents getting stopped by the authori-
ties and then getting deported. When I left for Scripps College ...
my parents couldn’t even accompany me into the airport. My
mom was terrified of going into the terminal for fear that
someone would ask her for documentation. 
Henna, U.S. citizen, California229
I used to work for a company in Pennsylvania. This was a
laundry company and we had a union that represented us.
Unfortunately I was injured inside the company. I was following
all the rules of the company and the union, so I reported every-
thing that happened to me.... I never intend[ed] to sue the
company because I really needed a job, but my boss was afraid I
was going to do that, so he called immigration on me.
Dubi, deported undocumented immigrant, Guatemala230
Just as some federal laws and policies simultaneously prohibit
and yet also encourage immigration status passing, a number of
state laws perform a similar function. In the last ten years there has
been an explosion of rulemaking by state governments involving
state regulation of immigrants’ lives according to their immigration
status.231 In 2015, for example, according to the National Conference
of State Legislatures, 216 separate state laws “dealing with immi-
gration” were enacted by state legislatures.232 These state laws and
regulations include laws permitting or requiring state actors to
perform immigration enforcement functions delegated by the federal
government.233 They also include “alienage laws” determining how
229. MY IMMIGR. STORY, supra note 96.
230. Older Stories, supra note 174.
231. See State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEG-
ISLATURES (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/state-laws-related-to-
immigration-and-immigrants.aspx [https://perma.cc/899L-5N7Y].
232. Id.
233. See, e.g., Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and
Nationality Act, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/287g
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the states as independent sovereigns interact with the immigrants
living within their jurisdiction.234 State laws and policies that add
to the existing pressures on immigrants to pass as holders of
different statuses to avoid deportation or civil or criminal penalties,
like their federal law counterparts, primarily involve immigration
enforcement or restrictions on immigrant employment. 
State law enforcement officers may be authorized to act on behalf
of federal immigration authorities and inquire into an immigrant’s
legal status by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) under
its so-called ICE ACCESS (Agreements of Cooperation in Commu-
nities to Enhance Safety and Security) Program.235 The program has
two key components: (1) federal-state agreements under section
287(g) of the INA236 and (2) the ICE Priority Enforcement Program
(PEP).237 Section 287(g) of the INA authorizes the Attorney General
to enter into agreements with state law enforcement agencies,
permitting designated officers to perform immigration law enforce-
ment functions.238 The delegated authority includes the power to
arrest and detain noncitizens for immigration violations, to invest-
igate immigration violations, and to collect evidence and prepare
immigration cases that will be brought before a federal immigration
judge.239 As of this writing, ICE has thirty-two active 287(g)
agreements in sixteen states and more than 1675 state and local law
enforcement officers have been “trained and certified to enforce
[https://perma.cc/25JT-5NZA] [hereinafter Section 287(g)].
234. For example, in a series of cases, the Court recognized the power of a state to restrict
the devolution of real property to noncitizens based on a state’s broad authority to regulate
real property within its borders. See Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326, 333-34 (1923); Webb v.
O’Brien, 263 U.S. 313, 321-22 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1923);
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 216-18 (1923).
235. See ICE ACCESS Programs: 287(g), the Criminal Alien Program, and Secure Com-
munities, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR. (Nov. 2009), https://www.nilc.org/issues/immigration-enforce
ment/ice-access-2009-11-05/ [https://perma.cc/N6CQ-N5RC].
236. See id.
237. See Priority Enforcement Program: How Is PEP Different from Secure Communities?,
U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/pep [https://perma.cc/9SC3-
9UH6].
238. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 133, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-563 to -564 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1357
(2012)) (adding section 287(g) to the INA).
239. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012); see also Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of
Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 198-99.
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immigration law.”240 PEP was launched in 2015 to replace the now-
discontinued Secure Communities Program.241 Under PEP, partici-
pating state law enforcement agencies use a secure web-based
system to submit arrestees’ fingerprints to ICE so that cross-checks
can be run in the agency’s databases.242 If there is a match between
the arrest record and a person who is a “priority” in the PEP
database, ICE will either request notification of when that person
is due to be released from state detention or will issue a request that
the person be detained by the state authorities for transfer to ICE
custody.243 Unauthorized immigrants and immigrants violating the
terms of their visas who live in states with active 287(g) agreements
or widespread use of PEP are (understandably) wary of interactions
with state officials. They are particularly afraid of scrutiny of their
immigration status. This prompts immigration status passing in a
variety of circumstances, ranging from social encounters with state
employees to routine traffic stops by state troopers.
Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Arizona v. United
States, “independent” state initiatives, uncoupled from authority
delegated by the federal government to police the immigration
status of state residents, have been severely limited.244 The only
exception to this general rule is the continued vitality of “show me
your papers” laws.245 The most well known of these is section 2(B)
of Arizona’s S.B. 1070,246 but similar provisions are found in
Georgia’s H.B. 87,247 Alabama’s H.B. 56,248 and South Carolina’s S.B.
20.249 These laws require state police and sheriff’s officers, whenever
240. See Section 287(g), supra note 233.
241. See Priority Enforcement Program: Overview, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
https://www.ice.gov/pep [https://perma.cc/9SC3-9UH6].
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., SB 1070 FOUR YEARS LATER: LESSONS LEARNED 2
(2014), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/SB1070-lessonslearned-2014-04-23.
pdf [https://perma.cc/9K48-MP5H].
245. Cf. id.
246. Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, S.B. 1070, ch. 113, 2010
Ariz. Sess. Laws 450 (codified as amended in scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. tits.
11, 13, 23, 28, 41).
247. Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011, H.B. 87, No. 252, 2011 Ga.
Laws 794 (codified in scattered sections of GA. CODE ANN. tits. 13, 16, 17, 35, 36, 42, 45, 50).
248. Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, H.B. 56, No. 535,
2011 Ala. Laws 888 (codified as amended at ALA. CODE § 31-13-1 to -35).
249. S.B. 20, No. 69, 2011 S.C. Acts 325 (codified in scattered sections of S.C. CODE ANN.
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they make an arrest for any suspected violation of any law and have
“reasonable suspicion” to believe that the individual is an undocu-
mented immigrant, to detain that individual until they can check
his immigration status.250 In Arizona v. United States, the Supreme
Court saw this provision as an “alienage” rule, consistent with the
State’s valid exercise of its police powers, rather than an impermis-
sible encroachment on federal immigration lawmaking.251 It
therefore ruled that these kinds of laws were constitutionally
permissible.252 State law enforcement officers in jurisdictions with
“show me your papers” laws therefore routinely inquire into the
immigration status of any individual who they encounter and arrest,
even if the arrest has nothing to do with immigration status and
even if the arrest would not otherwise lead to detention or a crim-
inal conviction.253 In jurisdictions with “show me your papers” laws,
the pressures upon immigrants encountering state police to pass as
holders of a more assimilated immigration status is even greater
than in jurisdictions where state law enforcement personnel have
authority delegated by the federal government. In “show me your
papers” states, any interaction with state police, no matter how
benign initially, has the potential to escalate into a situation of
arrest, detention, and ultimately deportation.254 The response in
those states’ immigrant communities has been widespread immi-
gration status passing.255
Immigration status passing is also particularly prevalent in
states that have independent state law restrictions on immigrant
employment that go above and beyond the minimum floor set forth
in the federal scheme. In a 2011 case, Chamber of Commerce of the
United States v. Whiting, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
state of Arizona could mandate that all employers in the state use
the federal E-Verify database, the use of which is ordinarily
tits. 6, 8, 16, 17, 23, 41).
250. See NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., supra note 244, at 1-2.
251. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2508-09 (2012).
252. Id. at 2510.
253. See, e.g., Brief of Former Arizona Attorneys General Terry Goddard et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 37 n.39, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012)
(No. 11-182).
254. Cf. id. at 12.
255. Cf. Anjana Mudambi, The Construction of Brownness: Latino/a and South Asian
Bloggers’ Responses to SB 1070, 8 J. INT’L & INTERCULTURAL COMM. 44, 55 (2015).
812 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:765
voluntary, in order to determine whether potential workers were
eligible for employment.256 In the aftermath of the Whiting case,
nineteen other states have enacted legislation requiring mandatory
use of E-Verify.257 Employers who fail to comply with these laws
are subject to state penalties in addition to any sanctions to which
they ordinarily would be subject under federal law.258 The explicit
goal of these laws is, predictably, to deter employers from hiring im-
migrants lacking the requisite authorization, with the intended
consequence of reduced employment of such unauthorized mi-
grants.259 This underscores the dilemma faced by immigrants
lacking employment authorization. The knowledge that employers
in a state are required to check work eligibility may deter unautho-
rized immigrants from seeking employment in the first place. More
frequently, however, given the economic necessities of life, those
same immigrants may choose to pass as holders of a different
immigration status.
3. Passing Because of Local Laws
The mayor forced the people going out of Hazleton. That’s the
truth. It’s really bad for everybody: for the city, for me, for my
family.... Before the ordinance, we made a lot of money. We had
a lot of customers, the Hispanic people.... Now, you see my store
is empty. No people in here. 
Maria Lopez Scott, U.S. citizen, Pennsylvania 260
The last thing I want to be doing [as a landlord] is asking,
‘Where’s your papers?’... And how am I supposed to know if what
they’re giving me is real?
Angie Iraheta, U.S. citizen, Texas261
256. 563 U.S. 582, 608-11 (2011).
257. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., E-VERIFY OVERVIEW 7, https://www.
uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Verification/E-Verify/E-Verify_Native_Documents/e-verify-
presentation.pdf [https://perma.cc/3J2Q-WALE].
258. See Whiting, 563 U.S. at 608-11.
259. Id. at 603-04.
260. Pennsylvania Town Passes Illegal Immigration Law, PBS NEWSHOUR (Sept. 1, 2006,
6:20 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/social_issues-july-dec06-immigration_09-01/ [https:
//perma.cc/G9K6-4J27].
261. Thomas Korosec & Terri Langford, Farmers Branch Illegal Immigrant Rule Blasted,
HOUS. CHRON. (Nov. 15, 2006, 6:30 AM), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/
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A slightly different constellation of immigration status passing
occurs with respect to various immigration-related local laws. Local
laws can affect immigration status passing in two distinct ways.
First, there are some local laws that, like their state counterparts,
are implicitly and avowedly anti-immigrant in that they essentially
require immigrants in certain statuses to pass as holders of an
alternative status in order to live their everyday lives. Second, there
are some local laws that might be viewed as more immigrant
friendly because they encourage immigrants to pass as holders of
more favorable immigration statuses by providing that no adverse
action will be taken against them on the basis of their immigration
status, unless and until they disclose that status.
The most notorious of the anti-immigrant local laws in recent
years are the so-called Illegal Immigration Relief Acts enacted by
some municipal governments that limit immigrants’ access to
housing, employment, or basic government services, such as water,
refuse removal, and other utilities.262 In 2006, for example, the City
of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, enacted two municipal ordinances: an
Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance (IIRAO)263 and a Rental
Registration Ordinance (RRO).264 The IIRAO made it unlawful for
any business located in whole or in part within the city limits to
employ, continue to employ, or recruit any person who lacked fed-
eral immigration status.265 It also prohibited any landlord within
the city from leasing or renting their property to undocumented
immigrants.266 The RRO required all persons renting a dwelling in
the city to obtain an occupancy permit.267 In order to obtain such a
permit, the applicant had to be over eighteen years of age and to
show proof of “legal citizenship and/or residency” in the United
Farmers-Branch-illegal-immigrant-rule-blasted-1910025.php [https://perma.cc/LK3K-28ZD].
262. See Lindsay Nash, Expression By Ordinance: Preemption and Proxy in Local
Legislation, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 243, 247-48, 250-52 (2011).
263. Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (Sept. 12, 2006), http://www.clearinghouse.net/
chDocs/public/IM-PA-0001-0010.pdf [https://perma.cc/8G73-DS2Z]; see Hazleton, Pa., Or-
dinance 2006-40 (Dec. 28, 2006), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/
hazleton_thirdordinance.pdf [https://perma.cc/BR5L-792N].
264. See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-13 (Aug. 15, 2006), https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/
immigrants/hazleton_firstordinance.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Z9Q-XNVL].
265. See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 § 4.
266. See id. § 5(A).
267. See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-13 §§ 6(a), 7(b). 
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States.268 Similarly restrictive local ordinances were enacted in
Farmers Branch, Texas,269 and Fremont, Nebraska.270
Legal challenges were launched by immigrants’ advocates to
contest these restrictive housing ordinances, but the federal courts
of appeal have reached differing conclusions in their recent rulings.
In Lozano v. City of Hazleton, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that the Hazleton ordinances were preempted by
the federal government’s plenary power to regulate immigration.271
In Villas at Parkside v. City of Farmers Branch, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit similarly ruled that the Farmers
Branch ordinance was impermissible because it created a new,
impermissible immigration-related state crime.272 In Keller v. Fre-
mont, in contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
held that Fremont’s similarly restrictive ordinance was permissible
because it was a law that applied to all Fremont residents, not only
immigrants residing within the city limits.273 Any unauthorized
migrants renting in Fremont are therefore required to pass as
holders of a different immigration status if they want to remain in
their homes.274 Any undocumented immigrants living in Hazleton
or Farmers Branch are no longer subject to criminal or civil
sanctions for doing so, but the prior existence of the ordinances
demonstrates, at the very least, a heightened social pressure to
conceal their underlying immigration status from their neighbors
and to pass as members of a more assimilated, and therefore more
favored, group.
In contrast, some municipalities have taken steps to allow
immigrants to pass as holders of different immigration statuses
precisely because they hope that such passing will build trust and
social capital in their communities. An example of this phenomenon
is the adoption of “don’t ask, don’t tell” protocols by local law
enforcement agencies. Like the former U.S. military policy of the
268. See id. §§ 1(m), 7(b)(1)(g).
269. See Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524, 526 (5th Cir.
2013) (en banc).
270. See Keller v. City of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931, 937 (8th Cir. 2013).
271. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297, 300 (3d Cir. 2013). 
272. Villas at Parkside, 726 F.3d at 529.
273. Keller, 719 F.3d at 951.
274. See id. at 950-51.
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same name,275 these protocols effectively prohibit local police offic-
ers from taking action against undocumented immigrants who are
passing as members of other immigrant groups. They do so by
simultaneously banning police officers from making inquiries into
an individual’s formal immigration status—unless that status is
relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation—and providing that
any adverse action based on an immigrant’s lack of formal immi-
gration status can be taken only if he volunteers information about
that status.276 For example, the City of New Haven, Connecticut,
has one such protocol, General Order 06-2, which precludes police
officers from inquiring into an individual’s immigration status.277
Similar measures exist in cities throughout the United States.278
As Professor Bill Ong Hing has explained, “don’t ask, don’t tell”
law enforcement protocols have two goals.279 First, the protocols are
designed to promote public safety by encouraging immigrant victims
of crime to come forward without fear that they will be required to
disclose information to the police that might lead to their removal
from the country.280 Second, the protocols are designed to preserve
economic resources by limiting police expenditures to nonimmigra-
tion-related crimes and by ensuring that police personnel time is not
expended on making immigration-related inquiries.281 Both pur-
poses were underscored at the time that New Haven General Order
06-2 was signed, but a particular emphasis was placed on com-
munity policing amongst vulnerable immigrant populations.282 As
the city announced, for example, “The formal policy is meant to
275. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 571,
107 Stat. 1547, 1670-73 (1993), repealed by Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515; Dep’t of Def. Directive 1304.26 (1993).
276. See, e.g., Press Release, City of New Haven, New Haven Police Issue Executive Order -
No Resident Should Be Afraid of Reporting Crime (Dec. 14, 2006), http://www.cityofnewhaven.
com/Mayor/ReadMore.asp?ID=%7B874974A9-AC89-465B-A649-57D122E9FAF9%7D
[https://perma.cc/3RWG-87EF] [hereinafter New Haven Press Release].
277. See id.
278. See NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., INCLUSIVE POLICIES ADVANCE DRAMATICALLY IN THE
STATES: IMMIGRANTS’ ACCESS TO DRIVER’S LICENSES, HIGHER EDUCATION, WORKERS’ RIGHTS,
AND COMMUNITY POLICING 13-15 (2013), http://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/
inclusive-policies-advance-in-states-2013-10-28.pdf [https://perma.cc/RLQ4-A7JZ].
279. Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Sanctuary Policies: Constitutional and Representative of
Good Policing and Good Public Policy, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 247, 310-11 (2012).
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
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encourage all residents, regardless of immigration status, to feel
comfortable reporting crime and talking with the police.”283 As the
example of General Order 06-2 shows, government encouragement
of immigration status passing need not be motivated solely by
animus. Here, the local government was attempting to encourage
immigrant passing to facilitate immigrant integration and stability
and to conserve its own resources—goals that are also readily
apparent in the context of immigration status covering.
C. Immigration Status Covering
Immigrant “covering” is both a long-standing sociocultural prac-
tice and a relatively recent legal phenomenon. As discussed in Part
I.C of this Article, for over a century, immigrants have engaged in
social status covering, by “toning down” aspects of their identity
that mark them as outsiders in order to fit into the more homoge-
nous American mainstream. Whether by adopting more western
dress or cultivating an American English accent and mannerisms,
immigrants have taken steps that allow others to disattend to the
fact that they are immigrants.284 Formal immigration status cover-
ing by operation of federal, state, or local laws, regulations, and
subregulatory policies is, however, a more recent phenomenon—or
at least a more recent widespread phenomenon. Since the passage
of the INA in 1952, immigration status conversion has been the gold
standard of immigrant assimilation.285 Since the 1980s, immigration
status passing has been a ubiquitous collateral consequence of
increasingly strict regulation of immigrant admission and immi-
grant employment, coupled with widespread underenforcement of
immigration laws.286 Only in the last decade or so, however, an
extraordinary number of federal, state, and local laws and policies,
which are most accurately characterized as facilitating immigration
status covering, have been implemented.
Unlike conversion, these covering laws and policies do not
transform the immigrant’s underlying (traditionally disadvantaged)
immigration status. Unlike passing, the immigrant is neither
283. See New Haven Press Release, supra note 276.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 79-82.
285. See supra Part II.A.1.
286. See supra Part II.B.1.
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required nor encouraged to conceal her immigration status, and she
does not need to claim to hold a more privileged immigration status.
Instead, the covering laws allow immigrants who would otherwise,
by virtue of their immigration status, be disqualified from access to
certain rights, privileges, and government services to have access.
These laws operate in practice to downplay the otherness of the
immigrant outsider, allowing local, state, and federal authorities to
disattend to that aspect of her identity. The diagrams below illus-
trate how these laws may operate in practice to temporarily elide
certain immigrants’ disfavored statuses, thereby providing them
with partial access to goods and services previously available
(partially or wholly) only to their more assimilated counterparts,
such as naturalized U.S. citizens and LPRs.
Figure 3.
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Figure 4.
Figure 5.
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This Section provides examples of immigration status covering
laws and policies at the federal, state, and local levels. At the fed-
eral level, this Section discusses Deferred Action (including DACA
and DAPA), as well as Temporary Protected Status, Parole, and
Administrative Closure. At the state level, this Section examines in-
state tuition initiatives and state issuance of driver’s licenses. At the
local level, this Section discusses the sanctuary city movement and
municipal identification cards. In each instance, the covering pro-
visions are tenuous and temporary—the protections that they offer
are typically discretionary, their availability to each individual
immigrant is largely unreviewable, and they are weakly described
by positive law.287 Yet, for many immigrants they constitute the only
available avenue for some form of (albeit limited) integration into
mainstream American society.
1. Covering by Operation of Federal Law
My parents had left me at the age of 2 back in Mexico with my
grandparents while they came to the U.S. They sent for me at the
age of 4 and that is when I crossed the border with my aunt.... I
am now 18 years old and thankful that I was able to qualify for
the DACA. With DACA I have been able to do so much. Thank-
fully I now have 2 jobs and I am in school. Although I am
undocumented, I do not give up my hopes and dreams of a better
life for my family.... As much as I would like to go visit my family
in Mexico, I can’t.
Wendy, DACA beneficiary, New York288
It would have been impossible for me to have a job with my
company if I didn’t have legal documents.... Thanks to TPS I was
able to find my job and stay in my job.
Alex Sanchez, TPS recipient289
287. See Heeren, supra note 15, at 1120 (“These individuals occupy a paradoxical middle
ground between legality and illegality, loosely tethered to this country by humanitarian
concern or prosecutorial discretion.”).
288. MY IMMIGR. STORY, supra note 96.
289. Alexandra Starr, For Some Immigrants, Temporary Life in U.S. Can Mean a Long
Stay, NPR (Jan. 13, 2015, 6:19 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/01/13/377003329/for-some-
immigrants-temporary-life-in-u-s-can-mean-a-long-stay [https://perma.cc/T4UQ-64TD].
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Today, perhaps the most high-profile iterations of immigration
status covering by operation of federal law are President Obama’s
two deferred action programs, Deferred Action for Childhood Ar-
rivals (DACA) and Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and
Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA).290 The DACA program was
launched in June 2012.291 It is designed to help DREAMers, that is,
young undocumented immigrants brought to the United States as
minors and raised in this country.292 In order to qualify for DACA,
under the 2012 provisions, a young person is required to show that
(1) he was was under the age of thirty-one as of June 15, 2012; (2)
he arrived in the United States before his sixteenth birthday; (3) he
has maintained a current and continuous residence in the United
States since June 15, 2007; (4) he was in the United States both on
June 15, 2012, and when he submitted a DACA request; (5) he had
no lawful immigration status on June 15, 2012; (6) he is currently
in school or has graduated from high school, obtained a General
Education Development (GED) certificate, or is an honorably dis-
charged veteran of the U.S. Armed Forces; and (7) he has not been
convicted of a felony, “significant misdemeanor,” or three or more
misdemeanors, and he does not pose a threat to national security or
public safety.293 Undocumented immigrants who are eligible for
DACA apply for the program in much the same way that eligible
immigrants apply for other immigration benefits—they submit a
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) application
form, which is available online, along with supporting evidentiary
documents, and pay a filing fee.294 As with other USCIS forms, there
is a detailed instruction sheet designed to help pro se applicants file
their DACA applications.295
290. See Executive Actions on Immigration, supra note 11.
291. See Julia Preston & John H. Cushman, Jr., Obama to Permit Young Migrants to
Remain in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/16/us/us-to-
stop-deporting-some-illegal-immigrants.html [https://perma.cc/N3AQ-L92B].
292. For a description of the term DREAMer, see supra note 83 and accompanying text.
293. Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-
arrivals-daca [https://perma.cc/6KJ5-HCXE] (last updated Dec. 22, 2016).
294. Id. See generally U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., OMB NO. 1615-0124, FORM
I-821D: CONSIDERATION OF DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS (2014) [hereinafter
FORM I-821D], https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/i-821d.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3ZJW-L2RS].
295. See FORM I-821D, supra note 294.
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Immigrants granted DACA often describe themselves as
“DACAmented.”296 This term captures the fact that their underlying
immigration status has not changed—they are still formally
undocumented—but they have been granted a temporary reprieve
from deportation, and along with it, temporary access to certain
benefits through the DACA program. In other words, once DACA-
mented, an undocumented immigrant has temporary authorization
to be present in the United States, even though she continues to
have no formal immigration status. Most important, a young person
granted DACA is no longer considered to be “unlawfully present” in
the United States, at least for its two-year duration.297 “Unlawful
presence,” a term of art in immigration law, refers to the time period
for which an individual is present in the United States without
authorization—either because of entry without inspection, a visa
overstay, or violation of the terms of a visa.298 A DACA recipient who
is no longer unlawfully present is eligible, if she can show economic
need, to apply for an employment authorization document that will
enable her to work legally for the two years of her DACA grant.299
She is able to apply for a driver’s license from her state Department
of Motor Vehicles.300 In many states, she is also eligible for in-state
tuition at state colleges and universities.301 This combination of
benefits has the potential to radically change her day-to-day
experiences and offers multiple pathways for greater social integra-
tion and feelings of belonging. Her underlying immigration status
has not been changed in any way, but the federal authorities’
296. See CAITLIN PATLER & JORGE A. CABRERA, INST. FOR RESEARCH ON LABOR & EMP’T,
FROM UNDOCUMENTED TO DACAMENTED: IMPACTS OF THE DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD
ARRIVALS (DACA) PROGRAM THREE YEARS FOLLOWING ITS ANNOUNCEMENT 3, 33 n.8 (2015),
http://www.chicano.ucla.edu/files/Patler_DACA_Report_061515.pdf [https://perma.cc/CG8X-
DMFG].
297. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B) (2012) (defining the term “unlawful presence” and stating
that those individuals are inadmissible).
298. Id.
299. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2016) (allowing work permission for a person granted
deferred action if she can show economic necessity).
300. See Esther Yu Hsi Lee, Nebraska Becomes the Last State in the Country to Pass a Law
Allowing DREAMers to Drive, THINKPROGRESS (May 28, 2015), http://thinkprogress.org/
immigration/2015/05/28/3663456/nebraska-drivers-license/ [https://perma.cc/DJM8-LTCL].
301. See Tuition Benefits for Immigrants, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (July 15, 2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/tuition-benefits-for-immigrants.aspx [https://perma.
cc/NJF2-3QF9].
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decision to formally disattend to that status provides cover along
a number of different dimensions with respect to a number of
different actors—from state and local governments, to employers, to
educational institutions. By June 2016, 844,931 young immigrants
had been granted DACA.302 This represents immigration status
covering on a hitherto unprecedented scale.
On November 20, 2014, President Obama announced his plans to
expand eligibility for the DACA program and to increase the
duration of the program and its attendant grant of work autho-
rization from two years to three years.303 At the same time, he
announced a new initiative, Deferred Action for Parents of Ameri-
cans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA).304 The DAPA
program was designed to work in much the same way as DACA. To
apply for DAPA, eligible undocumented immigrants would need to
prove (1) they were the parent of a U.S. citizen or LPR child who
was born on or before November 20, 2014; (2) they had lived in the
United States since January 1, 2010; (3) they had no lawful
immigration status on November 20, 2014; (4) they had not been
convicted of a felony, “significant misdemeanor,” or three or more
misdemeanors; and (5) they did not pose a threat to national
security or public safety.305 As with DACA recipients, immigrants
who qualify for DAPA would, under the terms of the program, no
longer be considered unlawfully present and would be able to apply
for work authorization from the federal government.306 Up to 4 mil-
lion of the estimated 11.2 million undocumented migrants present
in the United States might be eligible to apply for DAPA.307 With
302. Number of I-821D, Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals by Fiscal
Year, Quarter, Intake, Biometrics, and Case Status: 2012-2016 (June 30), U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGR. SERVS. (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/
Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/All%20Form%20Types/DACA
/daca_performancedata_fy2016_qtr3.pdf [https://perma.cc/574G-FPUY].
303. See Executive Actions on Immigration, supra note 11; see also President Barack
Obama, Address to the Nation on Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2014/11/20/remarks-president-address-nation-immigration [https://perma.cc/
Q52F-AH5X].
304. See Executive Actions on Immigration, supra note 11.
305. You May Be Able to Request DAPA, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (2015),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/ExecutiveActions/EAFlier_DAPA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AL9U-SS4Q].
306. See Executive Actions on Immigration, supra note 11.
307. See PASSEL ET AL., supra note 214, at 7; see also Pamela Constable & Julie Zauzmer,
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DAPA, as with DACA, the underlying undocumented status of the
immigrant beneficiaries would not change, but the disattendance of
the federal government to that status would open up numerous
opportunities for assimilation into mainstream society hitherto
denied to the “DAPAmented.”
The DAPA program provoked more controversy than DACA. The
DREAMer beneficiaries of DACA were widely perceived as sympa-
thetic and less culpable because they had been brought to the
United States as children.308 In contrast, the potential beneficiaries
of DAPA were adults who had deliberately chosen to either enter
the United States without inspection or overstay their visas, thereby
violating U.S. immigration law.309 In anticipation of objections to
the DAPA program, the Department of Justice released a series of
internal memoranda outlining their analysis of the legal authority
upon which the expanded DACA and DAPA programs were based.310
These memoranda explained that the President had prosecutorial
discretion to defer the removal of some of the 11.2 million undocu-
mented immigrants in the United States because he was responsible
for managing and allocating limited resources.311 In particular, the
memoranda explained the priority federal immigration law places
Illegal Immigrants to Rally at White House, Thank Obama for Deportation Reprieve, WASH.
POST (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/illegal-immigrants-to-rally-at-
white-house-thank-obama-for-deportation-reprieve/2014/11/21/145ccea0-71a0-11e4-893f-
86bd390a3340_story.html [https://perma.cc/8XZ4-4TXM].
308. See David Grant, Immigration Reform: From House Republicans, Some Sympathy for
DREAMers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 23, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/
2013/0723/Immigration-reform-From-House-Republicans-some-sympathy-for-DREAMers-
video [https://perma.cc/7B2H-NBSV] (“At a committee hearing, sympathy is expressed for
young DREAMers, but not their parents.”).
309. See id.
310. See The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of
Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38
Op. O.L.C., at 9 (Nov. 19, 2014) [hereinafter OLC Opinion], https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/2014-11-19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JWS9-HB64]; Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t; R.
Gil Kerlikowski, Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot.; Leon Rodriguez, Dir., U.S.
Citizenship & Immigration Servs.; & Alan D. Bersin, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Policy 1-5
(Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Sec’y Johnson Memorandum], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9BB-4PPP].
311. See OLC Opinion, supra note 310, at 9; Sec’y Johnson Memorandum, supra note 310,
at 1-5; see also SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF PROSECU-
TORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES 14-22 (2015).
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upon family unity concerns, which allowed the President to exercise
his prosecutorial discretion to defer the removal of the parents of
U.S. citizens and LPRs.312
Immigrant communities and their advocates and allies greeted
the launch of the expanded DACA and DAPA programs with great
enthusiasm.313 In contrast, many federal and state lawmakers—
particularly members of the Republican party—were vehemently
opposed.314 The U.S. House of Representatives passed a largely
symbolic resolution in opposition to expanded DACA and DAPA.315
Then, twenty-six states,316 led by the state of Texas, sued the
Department of Homeland Security to enjoin DAPA and expanded
DACA, arguing that the programs violated the notice-and-comment
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act and the Presi-
dent’s constitutional duty to “take care” to enforce the immigration
laws.317 On February 16, 2015, Judge Andrew S. Hanen of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted the states’
motion for a preliminary injunction.318 On November 9, 2015, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s ruling.319 On January 19, 2016, the Supreme Court of the
United States granted certiorari.320 On June 23, 2016, the U.S.
Supreme Court issued a one-line per curiam opinion, which stated
that “[t]he judgment [of the Fifth Circuit] is affirmed by an equally
divided Court.”321 Judge Hanen’s preliminary injunction therefore
remains in place, and the case moves to trial for a final determina-
tion as to whether DAPA and expanded DACA are permissible
312. See OLC Opinion, supra note 310, at 9; Sec’y Johnson Memorandum, supra note 310,
at 1-5.
313. See, e.g., Constable & Zauzmer, supra note 307.
314. See Grant, supra note 308.
315. See Jeremy W. Peters & Ashley Parker, On War and Immigration, Obama Faces Tests
of Authority from Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/05/us/
paul-forces-senate-vote-on-limiting-fight-against-isis.html [https://perma.cc/3RPW-SRS9].
316. For a list of the twenty-six plaintiff states see Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d
591, 604 n.1 (S.D. Tex.), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided court,
136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
317. Id. at 607
318. Id. at 677-78. 
319. Texas, 809 F.3d at 188. 
320. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906, 906 (2016) (mem.) granting cert. to 809 F.3d
134 (5th Cir. 2015).
321. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (per curium).
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exercises of executive power. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s
ruling, scholarly commentators are divided in their assessment of
the constitutionality of these programs, and whether they will
endure remains an open question, particularly in light of the
forthcoming change of administration.322 However, the focus of this
Article is not on whether such programs are legally permissible, but
how they currently operate—in the case of DACA—and may operate
in the future—in the case of DAPA—as a form of immigration status
“covering.”
Despite the ongoing controversy surrounding DACA and DAPA,
this form of immigrant covering is not a new invention. The DACA
and DAPA programs use the formal mechanism of “deferred action,”
a long-standing form of immigration prosecutorial discretion that
was previously offered on a limited case-by-case basis, as the foun-
dation for a widespread policy.323 In the 1970s, John Lennon was
granted “nonpriority status,” the precursor to modern deferred
action, to enable him to remain in the United States after he
overstayed his visa during a protracted custody battle over Yoko
Ono’s daughter, Kyoko, from her first marriage.324 Lennon’s attor-
ney, Leon Wildes, filed a federal Freedom of Information Act suit to
obtain information about how the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) of the time administered grants of nonpriority
status.325 He discovered that a grant of nonpriority status was a
temporary deferral of deportation, entirely at the INS’s discretion,
and subject to periodic review and summary reversal.326 It came
322. Compare Gabriel J. Chin, Symposium: From Here, Where to?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 23,
2016, 6:25 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-from-here-where-to/ [https://
perma.cc/23WY-X74D], with Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Obama Immigration Plan All
but Doomed, SCOTUSBLOG (June 23, 2016, 4:16 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/
opinion-analysis-obama-immigration-plan-all-but-doomed/ [https://perma.cc/49KU-UG3Z]. See
generally Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 14, at 107-225 (describing various examples in practice
of the Executive exercising inherent authority over immigration); Delahunty & Yoo, supra
note 14, at 856 (contending that DACA constitutes a violation of the Take Care Clause); Price,
supra note 14, at 674-75 (arguing that the President may decline to enforce civil and criminal
prohibitions in particular cases but not with respect to entire categories of persons).
323. See WADHIA, supra note 311, at 14-16.
324. See Leon Wildes, Not Just Any Immigration Case, CARDOZO LIFE (1998), http://www.
cardozo.yu.edu/life/spring1998/john.lennon [https://perma.cc/BA6M-2KCS].
325. See Leon Wildes, The Nonpriority Program of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service Goes Public: The Litigative Use of the Freedom of Information Act, 14 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 42, 44 (1976).
326. Id.
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with no particular attendant rights, beyond nondeportation at the
time of issuance.327 It was subject to no statutory or regulatory
provisions and was only possible because there was no congressional
mandate in the INA forbidding its use.328 In short, nonpriority
status constituted an unreviewable exercise of the federal govern-
ment’s prosecutorial discretion that could be reversed at any time.
During the 1990s, “nonpriority status” was replaced by “deferred
action,” but its core attributes—in particular its temporariness and
nonreviewability—remained the same. In 1996, Congress passed
two pieces of legislation, the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),329 and the Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.330 These statutes
eliminated many forms of judicial relief from removal331 and made
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, including grants of deferred
action, increasingly important. Most scholars have long assumed
that following the 1996 reforms and before DACA, immigration
prosecutors continued to exercise their discretion to grant deferred
action to immigrant respondents on a case-by-case basis.332 Geoffrey
Heeren, however, has recently shown that since 1996 deferred
action has been potentially available to “entire categories of un-
authorized immigrants.”333 Indeed, since 2000, the availability of
deferred action as a mechanism for prosecutorial discretion has been
linked to wide category-based priorities for immigration enforce-
ment.334 In that year, INS Commissioner Doris Meissner issued a
memorandum on prosecutorial discretion that reaffirmed the
existence of deferred action tied to the INS’s general authority to
327. See Leon Wildes, The Operations Instructions of the Immigration Service: Internal
Guides or Binding Rules?, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 99, 102-06 (1979).
328. Id.
329. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2012)).
330. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of tits. 8, 18, 22, 28, 42 U.S.C. (2012)).
331. See, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
§ 303(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2012).
332. See, e.g., Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 14, at 144; Peter Margulies, Taking Care of
Immigration Law: Presidential Stewardship, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Separation of
Powers, 94 B.U. L. REV. 105, 119 (2014). 
333. See Heeren, supra note 15, at 1152.
334. See Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm’r, Immigration & Naturalization Serv.
to Reg’l Dirs., Dist. Dirs., Chief Patrol Agents & Reg’l & Dist. Counsel 1 (Nov. 17, 2000).
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prioritize deporting some noncitizens over others.335 At the same
time, case-by-case grants of deferred action have continued apace.
Indeed, ICE continues to also grant deferred action on a case-by-
case basis to many immigrants each year.336
For all recipients of deferred action today, whether the deferral
is granted via a widespread program like DACA or through in-
dividual exercise of prosecutorial discretion by ICE trial attorneys,
deferred action offers a form of immigration status covering. All
recipients of deferred action lack formal immigration status.337 They
are not LPRs; they do not have a nonimmigrant visa; they are not
refugees or asylees. Instead, their underlying status remains that
of an undocumented immigrant. But, at the same time, they have
been granted a temporary reprieve from removal; as long as the
federal government does not change its mind about them—which,
theoretically, it may do at any time—they may remain in the United
States.338 Moreover, because they are no longer considered to be
“unlawfully present” in the United States, they can apply for an
employment authorization document that will enable them to work
legally.339 They have thus not experienced conversion to lawful
immigration status, nor are they passing as members of a more
favored immigrant group, but they are nonetheless able to enjoy
greater social integration into the mainstream.
Deferred action is not the only available avenue for immigration
status covering. The federal government also employs a variety of
other mechanisms that formally disattend to the undocumented
status of certain immigrants, thereby enabling them to live and
work in the United States on a temporary basis. One example is
parole, which is used to allow a person to cross the United States
border and enter the country without being considered formally
335. See id. at 4-5 (explaining that investigations focused on identifying high priority aliens
are preferable to investigations that identify a broader variety of removable aliens).
336. See Heeren, supra note 15, at 1120 n.14.
337. See Adjustment of Status; Certain Nationals of the People’s Republic of China, 62 Fed.
Reg. 63,249, 63,253 (Nov. 28, 1997) (“Deferred action does not confer any immigration status
on an alien, nor is it in any way a reflection of an alien’s lawful immigration status.”).
338. Id. (“Deferred action ... confers no protection or benefit on an alien. Deferred action
does not preclude the Service from commencing removal proceedings at any time against an
alien.”).
339. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2016).
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admitted under the immigration laws of the United States.340 This
“entry fiction” means that parolees are treated permanently as
though they have remained at the U.S. border, even if they have
lived and worked in the country for years.341 Historically, parole
was used as a means to permit the mass admission of certain groups
of refugees. In 1956, for example, following the Hungarian Revolu-
tion, approximately 30,000 Hungarian refugees were paroled into
the United States.342 Similarly, in 1980, during the Mariel boatlift,
approximately 125,000 Cubans were paroled into the country.343
During the 1996 immigration and welfare reforms, however,
Congress amended the INA to allow parole “only on a case by case
basis.”344 As a consequence, today the federal government grants
parole on a case-by-case basis to immigrants who present them-
selves at a port of entry with compelling humanitarian reasons to
enter the United States, but who do not meet the legal requirements
for entry.345 Most recently, a number of Central American mothers
and children fleeing gang violence in El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras have been paroled into the United States after arriving
at the southwest border.346 These immigrants have no permanent
immigration status, and their stay in the United States is tempo-
rary and contingent on the federal government’s discretion.347 Yet,
at the same time, they may apply for work authorization and are
not subject to immigration enforcement actions.348 They therefore
enjoy more stability and more social integration than their undocu-
mented counterparts.
340. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(B) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 212.5.
341. See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958) (“The parole of aliens
seeking admission ... was never intended to affect an alien’s status.”); Castellon, 17 I. & N.
Dec. 616, 620 (B.I.A. 1981) (holding that parolees as applicants for admission do not enjoy the
same constitutional rights afforded to aliens who have entered the country).
342. See MOTOMURA, OUTSIDE THE LAW, supra note 215, at 25.
343. See Yvette M. Mastin, Comment, Sentenced to Purgatory: The Indefinite Detention of
Mariel Cubans, 2 SCHOLAR 137, 142-43 (2000).
344. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
345. Humanitarian or Significant Public Benefit Parole for Individuals Outside of the
United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.uscis.gov/
humanitarian/humanitarian-or-significant-public-benefit-parole-individuals-outside-united-
states [https://perma.cc/6CBK-ZHJR].
346. See Scott Rempell, Credible Fears, Unaccompanied Minors, and the Causes of the
Southwestern Border Surge, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 337, 353-54 (2015).
347. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
348. See Executive Actions on Immigration, supra note 11.
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The same is true of immigrants granted Temporary Protected
Status (TPS), another form of federally authorized immigration
status covering. TPS was created by the Immigration Act of 1990 to
provide temporary relief from removal for immigrants who are
unable to return to their countries of origin due to armed conflict,
environmental disaster, or other extraordinary but temporary con-
ditions.349 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) maintains
a list of countries whose nationals may be eligible for TPS, which
currently includes El Salvador, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia,
Nepal, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan,
Syria, and Yemen.350 An applicant for TPS must demonstrate that
he (1) is a national of a duly designated country; (2) has been
continuously, physically present in the United States since nation-
als of that country were designated as eligible for TPS; (3) has
resided in the United States since the date designated for nationals
of his particular country; (4) has filed his application in a timely
manner; (5) has not committed a disqualifying crime; (6) is not
subject to any of the mandatory bars to a grant of asylum; and
(7) does not pose a threat to national security.351 TPS, like parole
and deferred action, is an inherently temporary form of relief and
confers no formal immigration status.352 As with deferred action
beneficiaries and parolees, persons granted TPS are never granted
formal admission to the United States for the purposes of the
immigration laws.353 Moreover, the period of TPS protection, and
therefore lawful presence in the United States and attendant work
authorization, ranges from six to eighteen months and the DHS
may, at any time, decide to revoke a grant of TPS or fail to renew
that grant.354 Despite this fact, some immigrants have held TPS for
over a decade.355 Indeed, current estimates suggest that over
349. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 302, 104 Stat. 4978, 5030 (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1254a (2012)).
350. See Temporary Protected Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.
uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status [https://perma.cc/P93Q-RH6H].
351. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2), 1254a(c)(1)-(2).
352. See id. § 1254a(a)(1).
353. See Serrano v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 1260, 1265-66 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)
(deferring to DHS’s position that TPS is not an admission). But, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit recently rejected DHS’s position. See Flores v. U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Servs., 718 F.3d 548, 554 (6th Cir. 2013).
354. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(2)-(3)
355. See, e.g., CARLA N. ARGUETA & RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20844,
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300,000 immigrants with TPS currently live and work in the United
States.356 The principal benefit of TPS, like parole and deferred
action, is the fact that it prevents an immigrant from being
“unlawfully present” and therefore enables her to obtain work
authorization and, in some states, a driver’s license.357 These two
benefits, as discussed above, allow immigration status covering by
TPS beneficiaries that permits them a certain degree of assimilation
into mainstream American society.
In addition to specific statutory, regulatory, and subregulatory
forms of immigration relief characterized by deferred action, parole,
and TPS, some immigrants are granted a minimal amount of im-
migration status covering when their pending immigration cases are
administratively closed by the federal government. In 2011, the
Obama Administration announced a prosecutorial discretion
initiative designed to halt removal cases against noncitizens with
close family, educational, or other ties in the United States and to
focus resources on purportedly dangerous “criminal immigrants.”358
From that date to December 2013, over 30,000 pending removal
cases have been administratively closed by ICE trial attorneys.359
Immigrants who benefit from administrative closure are no longer
in proceedings and no longer subject to instant deportation.360 In
many cases, immigrants in proceedings are eager to accept an offer
of administrative closure, even if it means that they lose forever the
opportunity to make out a case that they qualify for some form of
permanent, formal immigration status.361 This consigns them to a
path of immigration status covering, rather than immigration sta-
tus conversion. Like deferred action beneficiaries, parolees, and
TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS: CURRENT IMMIGRATION POLICY AND ISSUES 8 (2016)
(describing how many Liberians have lived in the United States under this status since the
1990s).
356. Id. at 3. As of February 2016, the most populous group was Salvadorans, with 204,000
TPS grants. Id. at 4 tbl.1.
357. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(1), (f).
358. See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to All
Field Office Dirs., All Special Agents in Charge & All Chief Counsel 1, 4-5 (June 17, 2011).
359. See Once Intended to Reduce Immigration Court Backlog, Prosecutorial Discretion
Closures Continue Unabated, TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Jan. 15, 2014),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/339/ [https://perma.cc/P793-Q8BP].
360. See Heeren, supra note 15, at 1118.
361. See id. at 1118-19.
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TPS holders, they may apply for work authorization.362 Depending
on the state in which they live, they may obtain a driver’s license.363
But, their underlying immigration status has not changed and will
not change. They have no discernable path to lawful permanent
residency or citizenship.364 They will pay taxes but are unable to
qualify for benefits like Social Security.365 They will not be able to
travel freely outside the United States.366 They will not be able to
vote or serve on a jury.367 They are covered but stuck on the
margins; they will never be converted.
2. Covering by Operation of State Law
The immigrants have benefitted a lot from [California’s AB 60]
because before, an immigrant who was driving and was stopped
due to a broken headlight, the police could stop them and
impound the car. The police got a lot of money from the cars of
immigrants. They know they can take them away. 
Alondra, undocumented immigrant, California368
All of this stuff can just disappear.... The world that we live in,
at this point in time, seems really uncertain.
J, state DREAM Act beneficiary, California369
Immigration status covering is not the sole preserve of the federal
government. Several states have also introduced measures designed
to allow a variety of different actors to disattend to immigrants’
underlying immigration statuses in order to enable those immi-
grants to better integrate into mainstream American society.
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, two
areas in which state governments have been particularly active in
362. See id. at 1158-59.
363. See id. at 1169-70.
364. See id. at 1119.
365. See id. at 1167.
366. See id. at 1159.
367. See id. at 1119.
368. Jennifer Chacón, Citizenship Matters: Immigrant Vulnerabilities and Immigration
Reform 18 (Mar. 10, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
369. Jennifer Adaeze Okwerekwu, First Wave of Undocumented Immigrants in Medical
Schools Face Uncertain Future, STAT (Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/03/18/
medical-school-daca/ [https://perma.cc/HZS9-RA6T].
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fostering this form of immigrant covering are access to higher
education and the issuance of driver’s licenses irrespective of
immigration status.370 States pursuing education-access initiatives
or issuing driver’s licenses are aware that some immigrant recipi-
ents lack the formal status that would ordinarily entitle them to
receive these benefits. Yet, they have nonetheless passed laws to
allow those immigrants access to the benefits, and through that
access they facilitate greater immigrant integration and participa-
tion. In other words, the state laws themselves operate to foster
immigration status covering.
States play a pivotal role in facilitating access to higher education
by holders of all forms of immigration status. The federal govern-
ment has a long-standing pattern and practice of stringently
regulating and closely monitoring access to higher education by
noncitizens.371 Under current immigration and welfare laws, non-
citizens’ access to a variety of government educational benefits,
including loans for undergraduate and graduate studies, is ex-
pressly restricted.372 Nevertheless, individual states “may provide
that an alien who is not lawfully present in the United States is
eligible for any State or local public benefit for which such alien
would otherwise be ineligible ... through the enactment of a State
law after August 22, 1996, which affirmatively provides for such
eligibility.”373 In accordance with this provision, a number of states
have enacted legislation designed to facilitate immigrant assimila-
tion through access to education.
Since 2001, many states have passed laws or promulgated policies
designed to facilitate access to higher education for all residents of
the state, regardless of their immigration status.374 For example,
370. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REPORT ON 2015 STATE IMMIGRATION
LAWS 1 (2016), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/statefed/ImmigrationReport2015Final_Feb
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/BV8T-WV8M].
371. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F) (2012) (providing criteria for admission of nonimmi-
grants on student visas); id. § 1184(m) (explaining limitations on foreign students attending
publicly funded institutions, including primary and secondary schooling). However, the
children of undocumented immigrants are granted free access to public primary and second-
ary schooling. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982).
372. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1623(a), 1611, 1641 (pertaining to undocumented immigrants); 34
C.F.R. §§ 668.130-.139 (2016) (pertaining to lawfully present migrants).
373. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) (“State authority to provide for eligibility of illegal aliens for State
and local public benefits.”).
374. Undocumented Student Tuition: State Action, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June
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some states have allowed state high school graduates to qualify for
in-state tuition at public universities.375 Other states have even cre-
ated in-state scholarship funds available to all residents, regardless
of immigration status.376
Today, the immigrant beneficiaries of these state education access
initiatives are graduating from college and attending graduate
school. As a consequence, a next generation of education-related
state law immigrant covering is emerging in the arena of profes-
sional licensure, particularly in law and medicine.377 California, for
example, has passed legislation that allows bar admission for all
persons, regardless of immigration status.378 Florida allows DACA
recipients to sit for its state bar exam.379 In 2014, a New York
appellate court ruled that an undocumented law school graduate’s
immigration status did not prevent him from passing the state bar’s
character and fitness requirements.380 In 2016 the Colorado Bar
admitted its first DREAMer.381 In the medical arena, 61 out of 145
12, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/undocumented-student-tuition-state-action.
aspx [https://perma.cc/V8S9-2RX3]; see also Margie McHugh, Mapping the Patchwork of State
‘DREAM Acts’ and Postsecondary Education Policies for Unauthorized Immigrant Youth,
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Oct. 2015), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/map
ping-patchwork-state-dream-acts-and-postsecondary-education-policies-unauthorized
[https://perma.cc/JE9J-RMQR].
375. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (West 2016); FLA. STAT. § 1009.26 (2016); 110 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 305/7e-5(a)(5), 520/8d-5(a)(5) (2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-731a(b)(2)(C) (2016);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 85-502 (2016); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-4.6(B) (2016); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§
355(2)(h)(8), 6206(7)(a) (McKinney 2016); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 54.052-.053 (West 2016);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53B-8-106 (West 2016); WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.15.012(2)(e) (2016).
376. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66021.7 (West 2016); 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. 947/67 (2016).
377. See Alan Gomez, Qualified Illegal Immigrants Seek Rights to Practice Law, USA
TODAY (updated July 2, 2012, 1:48 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/
2012-07-01/illegal-immigrants-want-to-practice-law/55943734/1 [https://perma.cc/67J6-JHF9];
Bryan Llenas, Undocumented Youth with Work Permits Seek Professional Licenses, FOX NEWS
LATINO (Jan. 22, 2013), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2013/01/22/undocumented-
youth-with-work-permits-seek-professional-licenses/ [https://perma.cc/KG7T-9PDX].
378. See Jennifer Medina, Allowed to Join the Bar, but Not to Take a Job, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/03/us/immigrant-in-us-illegally-may-practice-law-
california-court-rules.html [https://perma.cc/J4TW-ZUNF].
379. Jan Pudlow, Governor Signs Undocumented Attorney Bill, FLA. B. NEWS (June 1,
2014), https://www.floridabar.org/__85256aa9005b9f25.nsf/0/52b54e465c469ee785257cdd0044
afd4 [https://perma.cc/HFX2-UNWC]. 
380. See Cristian Farias, César Vargas Just Became New York’s First Undocumented
Lawyer, N.Y. MAG. (June 5, 2015, 1:15 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/06/new-
york-just-got-its-first-undocumented-lawyer.html [https://perma.cc/25UJ-MSMC].
381. Posting of Ediberto Román, Professor of Law, Fla. Int’l Univ., romane@fiu.edu, to
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accredited medical schools in the United States accept applications
from DACA recipients—all of which are located in states with state
DREAM Act provisions.382 Public university hospitals in those states
have agreed to allow DACAmented students to train in their clinics
and hospitals during their residencies.383 In each of these states,
once again, state law operates to allow an immigrant’s potential
employers, clients, and professional colleagues to disattend to his
underlying immigration status and to treat him as an assimilated
member of the mainstream.
The issuance of driver’s licenses to immigrants of all statuses has
proven to be more controversial than the various education access
statutes and regulations. This may be because possession of a
driver’s license facilitates immigration status covering to a much
greater extent and in a much wider variety of arenas than posses-
sion of a college degree. It may also be due, in part, to the fact that
the young DREAMer recipients of in-state tuition or other educa-
tional benefits are widely regarded as both socially and culturally
assimilated, as well as less culpable of immigration violations,
because they entered the United States as children. Thus, the
students’ success at sociocultural covering also contributes to their
success at immigration status covering. In contrast, those seeking
driver’s licenses may be of any age and any immigration status,
ranging from LPRs to nonimmigrant visa holders to TPS recipients
to undocumented migrant workers, many of whom lack any of the
markers of assimilation evinced by the DREAMers. But, this very
lack of sociocultural covering is what makes access to immigration
status covering, in the form of a driver’s license, so important to the
immigrant recipients.384
The federal REAL ID Act of 2005 introduced strict guidelines for
the issuance of state driver’s and nonoperator’s licenses.385 Amongst
other provisions, the Act places almost insurmountable barriers to
the provision of regular driver’s licenses to undocumented immi-
grants and places restrictions on the issuance of driver’s licenses to
immprof-bounces@lists.ucla.edu (Mar. 8, 2016) (on file with author).
382. See Okwerekwu, supra note 369.
383. See id.
384. See Manning & Stumpf, supra note 15, at 34.
385. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 202(c)(2), 119 Stat. 302, 312-13 (codified
as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 30301 (2012)).
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nonimmigrant visa holders.386 Despite specific mention in the Act of
deferred action and TPS recipients as eligible for driver’s licenses,
several states previously refused to issue them to deferred action
beneficiaries.387 Today, there is consensus among all fifty states that
deferred action recipients, particularly the DACAmented, may ob-
tain driver’s licenses.388 However, there is widespread disagreement
about the extent to which this form of immigration status covering
should be extended to other immigrant groups, most notably
undocumented migrants not subject to any form of federal immigra-
tion status covering.
Ten states and the District of Columbia currently permit all
residents, irrespective of immigration status, to obtain driver’s
licenses.389 Almost all of the states in question—California, Colo-
rado, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah,
Vermont, and Washington—have well-established immigrant com-
munities, including large undocumented populations.390 However,
these states have adopted different approaches to the degree of
immigration status covering that they will allow through driver’s
licensing, based upon the nature of the licenses issued. Two states,
Washington and New Mexico, issue the same standard license to all
applicants, regardless of their immigration status.391 Two others,
Colorado and Illinois, issue “temporary” licenses to a variety of
immigrants, including conditional LPRs, nonimmigrant visa
holders, and undocumented migrants.392 The Illinois license states
on its face, in bold, capital letters, that it is a temporary license and
386. Id.
387. See, e.g., Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 945 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1053, 1074-75 (D.
Ariz. 2013) (finding that Arizona’s efforts to deny driver’s licenses to persons with DACA
violated equal protection), rev’d on other grounds, 757 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2014); Saldana v.
Lahm, No. 4:13CV3108, 2013 WL 5658233, at *1, *7 (D. Neb. Oct. 11, 2013) (granting in part
the motion to dismiss a challenge to Nebraska’s refusal to grant a driver’s license to a DACA
grantee).
388. Nebraska was the last state to allow the DACAmented to obtain licenses. See Lee,
supra note 300.
389. See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., DECIDING WHO DRIVES: STATE CHOICES SURROUNDING
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS AND DRIVER’S LICENSES 1 (2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/
media/assets/2015/08/deciding-who-drives.pdf [https://perma.cc/YQU3-CY7H].
390. See id. (estimating that approximately 37 percent of undocumented immigrants live
in one of these states).
391. See id. at 7.
392. See id.
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cannot be accepted as a form of government-issued identification.393
Six states—California, Connecticut, Maryland, Nevada, Utah, and
Vermont—and the District of Columbia issue alternative driver’s
licenses to unauthorized migrants.394 For example, the statutes in
force in the District of Columbia and Maryland require that their
licenses must clearly state that they are not acceptable by federal
agencies for official purposes.395 Utah’s “driving privilege card” is a
different color from the state’s regular licenses and specifies on its
face that it is “[n]ot valid for identification.”396 Colorado’s “temporary
license” features a black banner stripe and a statement that it may
not be used for “federal identification, voting, or public benefit
purposes.”397
AB 60, the California law permitting the issuance of alternative
driver’s licenses to unauthorized immigrants, specifically requires
that the alternative license should appear similar to the standard
California license—demonstrating California legislators’ under-
standing of the potential stigma attached to a distinctive “second
class” license.398 After a series of disagreements with DHS about
whether such a license would be sufficiently distinctive to comply
with the requirements of the REAL ID Act,399 a license featuring
language on its face stating that “Federal Limits Apply” was deemed
a satisfactory solution.400 AB 60 is perhaps the most high-profile,
and therefore most analyzed, of the immigrant covering state
driver’s licensing laws. The bill, which was passed in 2013, went
into effect on January 1, 2015.401 Nearly 500,000 undocumented
immigrants applied for driver’s licenses in California in its first
393. See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 389, at 7; see also 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-105.1
(2016).
394. See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 389, at 7.
395. D.C. CODE § 50-1401.01 (2016); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 16-122 (West 2016).
396. See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 389, at 7.
397. Id.
398. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 12801(d)(1) (West 2016).
399. See Ian Lovett, Federal Officials Reject Design of California Driver’s Licenses for
Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/07/us/federal-
officials-reject-design-of-california-drivers-licenses-for-illegal-immigrants.html
[https://perma.cc/KU4V-YS8M].
400. See Jeremy B. White, Feds Give Green Light to California Immigrant Licenses, SACRA-
MENTO BEE (Sept. 19, 2014, 3:47 PM), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/
capitol-alert/article2610422.html [https://perma.cc/4732-6T59].
401. See id.
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three months.402 Initial reports suggest that AB 60 has had a
transformative effect on the lives of its undocumented immigrant
beneficiaries, enabling them to drive without fear of being stopped
by state or local police, arrested, detained, or fined, and thereby
facilitating their daily access to work, friends, and family.403 AB 60
and the other state laws like it demonstrate the great impact that
immigrant covering by operation of state law may have, even when
there is no change to the immigrant beneficiaries’ underlying
immigration status.
3. Covering by Operation of Local Law
The San Antonio Police Department’s position is that we do not
want to isolate the community from the police department, so we
don’t ask people about their immigration status. The relationship
we’ve built with the community over the years is a fragile one. If
the community got the idea that police were going to ask them for
their papers, it would frighten them away from calling the police
or communicating with the police in any way. We don’t want to
see that happen. 
William McManus, San Antonio Police Chief, Texas404
Everywhere you go, everybody’s asking, ‘Can I have your ID? Can
I have your ID?’ This [city-issued ID] is good for the people who
don’t have the identity.
Wa Sutardji, immigration status unknown, New York405
Local governments, like their state counterparts, are also increas-
ingly engaging in rulemaking that facilitates immigration status
402. See Press Release, Cal. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, Nearly 500,000 Apply for Licenses
Under AB 60 (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/pubs/newsrel/newsrel15/
2015_27 [https://perma.cc/WNU2-PM8Y].
403. See ASHAR ET AL., supra note 15, at 34.
404. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, VOICES FROM ACROSS THE COUNTRY: LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS DISCUSS THE CHALLENGES OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 7 (Craig
Fischer ed., 2012), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/ Immigra
tion/voices%20from%20across%20the%20country%20-%20local%20law%20enforcement%
20officials%20discuss%20the%20challenges%20of%20immigration%20enforcement%20201
2.pdf [https://perma.cc/59MR-SENE].
405. Hansi Lo Wang, New York City ID Could Open Up Doors—and Privacy Concerns, NPR
(Jan. 12, 2015, 4:18 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/01/12/376788822/new-york-city-id-could-
open-up-doors-and-privacy-concerns [https://perma.cc/CQ37-FW6P].
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covering by the immigrant communities that live within their
borders.406 Municipal governments may have no formal role to play
in the promulgation of immigration laws, but they nonetheless play
an important role in the regulation of the daily lives and experi-
ences of immigrants within their communities.407 As discussed in
Part II.B, in localities pursuing immigrant-exclusionary policies,
local laws can create an environment that effectively mandates
immigration status passing. In localities seeking to foster social
integration by immigrants, municipal laws and policies can have a
very different effect, facilitating immigration status covering. This
form of immigrant covering is evident in a variety of local govern-
ment initiatives, including sanctuary city ordinances and municipal
identification card initiatives.
So-called sanctuary laws are currently in force in cities through-
out the United States—ranging from major urban centers such as
New York City and Los Angeles,408 to smaller towns such as
Durango, Colorado,409 and Ashland, Oregon.410 Sanctuary laws—
whether statutes, resolutions, ordinances, or executive orders—were
initially introduced in the 1970s and 1980s to prevent state and
local police from engaging in the enforcement of federal immigration
laws or handing immigrants in local custody over to federal immi-
gration authorities.411 Today, these laws and policies have evolved
406. See, e.g., Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty
and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1374-75 (2006) (providing
several examples of such rulemaking).
407. I have written elsewhere about the increasingly important role of immigrant-
inclusionary initiatives at the state and local level. See Stella Burch Elias, The New
Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 703, 734-36, 744-47 (2013).
408. See Aaron Morrison, Immigrant Identification Card: New York City Issues Over 730K
Free IDs, One Year After Program Launches, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2016, 11:00 AM),
http://www.ibitimes.com/immigrant-identification-card-new-york-city-issues-over-730k-free-
ids-one-year-after-2263399 [https://perma.cc/L2NB-WD5L].
409. See Laura Sullivan, Comment, Enforcing Nonenforcement: Countering the Threat
Posed to Sanctuary Laws by the Inclusion of Immigration Records in the National Crime
Information Center Database, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 567, 576-77 (2009).
410. See NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., LAWS, RESOLUTIONS AND POLICIES INSTITUTED
ACROSS THE U.S. LIMITING ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS BY STATE AND LOCAL
AUTHORITIES 16 (2008), http://www.ailadownloads.org/advo/NILC-LocalLawsResolutionsAnd
PoliciesLimitingImmEnforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6BU-7VKM].
411. See Pham, supra note 406, at 1382-83; see also Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Rose
Cuison Villazor, Sanctuary Policies & Immigration Federalism: A Dialectic Analysis, 55
WAYNE L. REV. 1683, 1683-85 (2009) (discussing San Francisco’s sanctuary law).
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to encompass the provision of a wide variety of services to immi-
grant residents.412 But for many immigrants—particularly undocu-
mented migrants who live in constant fear of removal from the
country—the law enforcement noncooperation provisions remain of
paramount importance. In 2008, approximately seventy local jur-
isdictions had prevented their law enforcement officials from
inquiring into an individual’s immigration status or discriminating
against persons on the basis of that status.413 Noncooperation with
federal immigration authorities is, or at some point in the recent
past has been, a routine part of local law enforcement policies and
practices in California, Maine, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Mexico,
New York, and Oregon.414 
The immigration status covering embodied in these sanctuary
ordinances is particularly striking because provisions in the IIRIRA
explicitly bar local governments from preventing their employees
from “[e]xchanging such information with any other Federal, State,
or local government entity.”415 Legal challenges to local sanctuary
laws based on the relevant clauses of those federal laws have,
however, thus far been unsuccessful. One such failed attempt was
a 2009 lawsuit seeking to enjoin Los Angeles’s Special Order 40,
which precludes Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers
from inquiring into individuals’ immigration statuses or arresting
individuals on the suspicion of having committed immigration-
related crimes.416 In that case, Sturgeon v. Bratton, the California
Court of Appeals held that nothing in the federal laws prohibited
states and localities from instructing their officers to refrain from
412. See Pham, supra note 406, at 1389-91; see also, e.g., Jennifer Medina, New Haven
Approves Program to Issue Illegal Immigrants IDs, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2007), http://www.
nytimes.com/2007/06/05/nyregion/05haven.html [https://perma.cc/UJ32-6DFK] (detailing the
benefits the New Haven sanctuary laws afford immigrant residents).
413. See NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., supra note 410, at 1-20.
414. See id. at 1-2, 6-8, 14-16. State measures limiting state enforcement of federal immi-
gration restrictions have included, for example, OR. REV. STAT. § 181A.820(1) (2016); Me. Exec.
Order No. 13 FY 04/05 (Apr. 9, 2004), rescinded by Me. Exec. Order No. 08 FY 11/12 (Jan. 6
2011); N.M. Exec. Order No. 2005-019 (Apr. 7, 2005), rescinded by N.M. Exec. Order 2011-009
(Jan. 31, 2011).
415. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(b)(3) (2012); see also id. § 1644 (“[N]o State or local government entity
may be prohibited, or in any way restricted, from sending to or receiving from the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service information regarding the immigration status, lawful or
unlawful, of an alien in the United States.”).
416. Sturgeon v. Bratton, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718, 722-23 (Ct. App. 2009).
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obtaining information about immigrants’ statuses, and thus federal
law did not preempt the LAPD order.417 Local governments therefore
enjoy the discretion, in exercise of their police powers, to determine
how best to allocate their resources, including deploying those
resources in such a way as to disattend to their immigrant residents’
formal immigration statuses.
One recent example of immigration status covering through the
operation of local law is the issuance of municipal identification
cards to all residents, irrespective of immigration status. A number
of cities, including New Haven, Connecticut, Oakland, California,
San Francisco, California, and Richmond, California, have imple-
mented these municipal ID programs.418 Similar county-wide
“community IDs” have been issued by Johnson County, Iowa,419 and
Mercer County, New Jersey.420 These photographic IDs, issued by
city or county officials to all persons who can demonstrate residence
in the locality, are designed primarily to help local residents access
city services and obtain the assistance of police.421 In some localities,
the cards fulfill these functions directly, by operating as a library
card or parking card.422 In other locations, they are accepted as a
government-issued ID that enables the holder to join a city library
or access a city park facility, such as a beach or swimming pool.423
The cards may also be used to open bank accounts or collect
prescription medications from pharmacies.424 Apparently, the cards
have proven to be particularly helpful for immigrants unable to
obtain any other form of U.S. government-issued ID, such as a state
driver’s license.425 Once again, possession of a municipal ID card
417. Id. at 731-33.
418. See CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY, WHO WE ARE: MUNICIPAL ID CARDS AS A LOCAL
STRATEGY TO PROMOTE BELONGING AND SHARED COMMUNITY IDENTITY 11, 14, 16 (2013)
[hereinafter WHO WE ARE], https://populardemocracy.org/sites/default/files/municipal%
20id%20report.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6B3-J7P4].
419. See THE CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY, BUILDING IDENTITY: A TOOLKIT FOR
DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING A SUCCESSFUL MUNICIPAL ID PROGRAM 1 (2015) [hereinafter
BUILDING IDENTITY], http://populardemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Municipal-ID-Report-
web.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5SV-MB9E].
420. See WHO WE ARE, supra note 418, at 21.
421. See id. at 7-8.
422. Id. at 12, 14, 18-19, 21-22 (providing detailed accounts of such localities).
423. See id. at 12.
424. See id. at 14, 17, 19, 21.
425. See BUILDING IDENTITY, supra note 419, at 1-2.
2017] IMMIGRANT COVERING 841
does not affect an immigrant’s underlying immigration status in any
way. But it allows her to access certain goods and services that
require a photo identification without needing to use fraudulent
documents to pass as a holder of a different immigrant status. Her
underlying status is not converted, but she is given a means to
ensure that actors who would ordinarily attend to that status, and
discriminate against her accordingly, disattend to her disfavored
characteristic and treat her like her more assimilated peers.
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRANT COVERING
In the continued absence of comprehensive immigration reform,
which could allow widespread immigration status conversion,426 and
in the face of myriad pressures on immigrants to actively conceal
their immigration status and pass as holders of a more privileged
status,427 the rise of immigration status covering seems inevitable.
For those who are in favor of greater integration of all immigrant
groups, irrespective of formal legal status, it also appears, at first
glance, to be normatively desirable. Federal laws and regulations,
state statutes, and local ordinances that facilitate immigration
status covering actively contribute to the inclusion of disfavored
immigrant communities, allowing hitherto marginalized groups and
individuals to better integrate into American society. For this
reason, many immigrants and their allies and advocates have
offered unalloyed praise for federal law covering programs such as
DACA, state law covering initiatives such as alternative driver’s
licenses, and local law covering schemes such as municipal ID cards.
The scholarly literature on covering in other, nonimmigration con-
texts, however, suggests that such a view may oversimplify the
consequences of a complex phenomenon. This Part therefore builds
upon the insights gleaned from the scholarly literature critiquing
covering in other contexts to discuss the potential advantages and
pitfalls of our growing national reliance on immigrant covering.
426. See Blake, supra note 10.
427. See supra Part II.B.
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A. The Potential Advantages of Immigrant Covering
Throughout my life I never thought it would be such a big deal
being illegal until I got to high school and staring [sic] applying
for my licenses or college scholarships. Obviously I was denied
for not having a social security number. Later on Mr. President
Obama gave us an opportunity named deferred action and it has
opened to [sic] many doors for me! I’m truly blessed. I was able
to obtain my driver licenses [sic] and continue school. Honestly
my life has completely changed.
Allison, DACA beneficiary, North Carolina428
[W]e need the right to work. We deal with it every day. You are
working under low salaries, exploitation, bad working condi-
tions. You have to deal with it every day.
Anonymous, undocumented immigrant, California429
Immigration status covering provided by governmental actors at
the federal, state, and local levels has the potential to transform the
lives of immigrant communities. The scholarly literature on
covering because of race, gender, and sexual identity suggests that
covering may allow individuals access to otherwise foreclosed
opportunities.430 That is undoubtedly true in the immigration
context. On a practical level, immigration status covering can open
up a variety of opportunities for immigrants whose options for
education, employment, and access to goods and services were
previously limited. Less tangible, but equally significant, immigra-
tion status covering can provide some psychological benefits for
individuals who were previously crippled by chronic fears of de-
portation and other experiences of societal alienation.431 This is
particularly true for unauthorized immigrants, whose struggles
have been extensively documented by social science researchers.432
428. MY IMMIGR. STORY, supra note 96.
429. Chacón, supra note 368, at 20.
430. See discussion supra Part I.C.
431. See, e.g., Carola Suárez-Orozco et al., Growing Up in the Shadows: The Developmental
Implications of Unauthorized Status, 81 HARV. EDUC. REV. 438, 443-44, 451-56, 459 (2011)
(detailing the trauma associated with unauthorized status).
432. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., BEYOND SMOKE AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN
IMMIGRATION IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 118-26 (2002) (detailing the negative effect
of undocumented status on wages). 
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But refugees and asylees, nonimmigrant visa holders, and even
certain LPRs may benefit from being treated on par with U.S.
citizens, although they do not hold that formal legal status.
The practical advantages of immigration status covering can be
seen through the impact of federal programs, such as deferred
action, parole, TPS, and administrative closure, when they are
accompanied by the issuance of an employment authorization
document to a previously undocumented immigrant beneficiary. As
discussed in detail in Part II.B, federal immigration laws tightly
regulate the employment of immigrants on the theory that
“[e]mployment in the United States is not an inherent right,” but
instead “a matter of administrative discretion.”433 The IRCA pro-
vides for harsh penalties for employers hiring undocumented
workers434 and underscores the immigration removal consequences
for any immigrants working without authorization—whether
because they are undocumented or not authorized to work in the
United States under the terms of their nonimmigrant visas.435 As a
consequence, as discussed in Part II.B, immigrants who lack em-
ployment authorization but work to support themselves and their
families frequently pass as authorized workers. In so doing, they
may violate a range of federal and state immigration and criminal
laws and regulations—particularly if they work under an assumed
name using fabricated identity documents—putting them at risk of
civil sanctions and criminal penalties.436 Because of unauthorized
workers’ fears of the risks of discovery, their employment is often
underpaid and underregulated, with widespread wage theft, wage
and hour violations, and health and safety infractions by unscrupu-
lous employers.437 Undocumented immigrants with postsecondary
education also often find themselves underemployed, working in
subminimum wage jobs, despite their college degrees and other
433. Employment Authorization to Aliens in the United States, 46 Fed. Reg. 25,079,
25,080-81 (May 5, 1981) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 109).
434. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)-(f) (2012).
435. 8 U.S.C. § 1227.
436. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (2012).
437. See Wishnie, supra note 239, at 214. Median household income of unauthorized
immigrants was $36,000 in 2007, compared to $50,000 for their U.S.-born counterparts. See
JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., A PORTRAIT OF UNAUTHORIZED
IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (2009), http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/107.
pdf [https://perma.cc/37BS-QWTH].
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advanced qualifications.438 Obtaining work authorization has an
immediate effect on the employment prospects of an undocumented
worker.439 For example, some deferred action recipients describe
wage increases, access to company benefit programs, and eligibility
for graduate trainee programs among the short-term employment
consequences of receiving employment authorization documents.440
The provision of driver’s licenses by state governments appears
to have a similarly immediate and fundamental effect on the lives
of previously ineligible immigrants. Many undocumented immi-
grants, refugees, asylees, and nonimmigrant visa holders live in
areas without comprehensive public transit systems.441 As a result,
in order to work, take children to school, attend church, or seek
medical care, immigrants in these areas drive without a license.442
As with working without authorization, driving without a valid
license can lead to a variety of serious outcomes, including fines, the
impounding of the vehicle, the arrest and detention of the immi-
grant driver, and even potentially the immigrant being placed in
removal proceedings and deported from the country.443 Tellingly, in
a recent study of undocumented immigrants in Southern California
undertaken by Professors Sameer Ashar, Jennifer Chacón, Susan
Bibler Coutin, and Stephen Lee, many interviewees frequently and
spontaneously discussed how their lives had been transformed
positively by the passage of California’s AB 60, which allows certain
qualified undocumented immigrants to obtain driver’s licenses.444
State education access initiatives are another form of immigra-
tion status covering that appear to offer many practical advantages
438. See ASHAR ET AL., supra note 15, at 16.
439. See, e.g., ROBERTO G. GONZALES & VERONICA TERRIQUEZ, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR.,
HOW DACA IS IMPACTING THE LIVES OF THOSE WHO ARE NOW DACAMENTED: PRELIMINARY
FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL UNDACAMENTED RESEARCH PROJECT (2013), https://www.
americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/daca_final_ipc_csii_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PPV3-9MVV]; see also PATLER & CABRERA, supra note 296, at 20.
440. See PATLER & CABRERA, supra note 296, at 21. But there is no guarantee that this will
be the case. See Jason Dzubow, Immigration Rant, GREEN CARD (Immigration Law Section,
Fed. Bar Ass’n, Arlington, Va.), Winter 2016, at 3-4, http://www.fedbar.org/Image-Library/
Sections-and-Divisions/Immigration/Winter-2016--Green-Card.aspx [https://perma.cc/ULU7-
BHTZ].
441. See, e.g., ASHAR ET AL., supra note 15, at 18.
442. See id.
443. See id.
444. See id. at 34.
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to their immigrant recipients. As the U.S. Supreme Court recog-
nized in 1982 in Plyler v. Doe, education is the foundation of basic
integration, without which immigrant newcomers would be denied
“the ability to live within the structure of our civic institutions, and
foreclose[d] [from] any realistic possibility ... [to] contribute in even
the smallest way to the progress of our Nation.”445 Any form of
postsecondary education, but particularly college attendance, has
been shown to be a highly effective route for the inclusion of
immigrant youth into American society.446 Education access ini-
tiatives, most notably those involving tuition assistance, have
significantly improved both the economic well-being and the
sociocultural integration of young immigrants.447
At the local level, immigration status covering instruments, such
as municipal ID cards, appear to play a similarly important
practical role. For example, the opportunity to use such cards to
open bank accounts has purportedly led to increased community
safety.448 In communities where undocumented immigrants are
unable to produce the requisite identification documents to open
bank accounts, immigrants routinely carry large sums of cash on
their persons or store large sums of cash in their homes, making
them easy targets for criminals.449 These same immigrants are wary
of any contact with police officers, because of their lack of formal
immigration status.450 As a consequence, when they are the victims
of crime—whether muggings or burglaries—they are unlikely to
report the crime to the authorities, leading to unchecked criminal
activity and widespread threats to public safety.451 Anecdotal
accounts from localities that have introduced their own local
identification documents suggest that those municipal or commu-
nity ID cards have considerably ameliorated this problem.452
445. 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (striking down state denial of public primary and secondary
education to undocumented children).
446. See Sandy Baum & Stella M. Flores, Higher Education and Children in Immigrant
Families, FUTURE CHILDREN, Spring 2011, at 171, 183-84.
447. See id. at 184.
448. See WHO WE ARE, supra note 418, at 11, 17-18.
449. See id. at 11.
450. See id.
451. See id.
452. See id. at 11, 16-18, 20.
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In addition to these practical benefits, there are also clear psy-
chological advantages for the subjects of federal, state, and local
immigrant covering initiatives when compared to their peers who
engage in immigration status passing. Immigrants passing in their
daily lives as holders of a different immigration status, and vio-
lating criminal and civil laws to do so, live in constant fear of
discovery and its consequences. First and foremost, these covering
laws go some way to reducing the immigrant beneficiaries’ fears of
the imminent risk of arrest leading to deportation.453 As discussed
in Part II.C, all of the federal immigration status covering provi-
sions—deferred action, parole, TPS, and administrative closure—
are of limited temporal duration and may, theoretically, be revoked
at any time at the federal government’s pleasure. Nonetheless, the
recipients of these benefits have a more formalized relationship with
the federal immigration authorities than undocumented immigrants
who have had no such contact. Immigrants subject to deferred
action, parole, TPS, and administrative closure have been assessed
as a lower removal priority than their undocumented peers and thus
have more confidence that an encounter with government au-
thorities, such as a routine traffic stop, will not inexorably lead to
deportation.454 This greater confidence could even extend to
individuals theoretically eligible for certain forms of federal
immigration status covering who chose not to apply for it. Thus,
even DACA-eligible youth who have chosen not to apply for the
program may believe that their presumptive eligibility offers them
some degree of protection from apprehension and removal because
others in their situation have been deemed to be a low enforcement
priority.455
Another notable psychological benefit of immigration status
covering initiatives is that they go some way toward enabling
immigrants to be their authentic selves in their everyday lives. The
access to employment authorization or to a driver’s license in an
immigrant’s own name is not valuable just because it obviates the
453. See PATLER & CABRERA, supra note 296, at 25-26.
454. See ASHAR ET AL., supra note 15, at 14.
455. But individuals who are not priorities for removal are hardly immune from deporta-
tion. See Bill Ong Hing, The Failure of Prosecutorial Discretion and the Deportation of Oscar
Martinez, 15 SCHOLAR 437, 439-40, 472-73, 491-93, 498-99 (2013) (discussing the deportation
of purportedly low-priority noncitizens with attention to one particular case).
2017] IMMIGRANT COVERING 847
need to pass by using false documents and the attendant risk of
arrest, detention, and deportation.456 It is also valuable because it
permits a degree of openness about an immigrant’s fundamental
identity in the workplace, in social settings, and in encounters with
the police and other government officials. Alongside this greater
openness and authenticity come increased feelings of acceptance by
the broader American community and more opportunities for
participation and belonging in mainstream society. In short, im-
migration status covering, whether by operation of federal, state, or
local laws, has several clear advantages for many immigrant
individuals and their communities.
B. The Potential Pitfalls of Immigrant Covering
[P]rograms like DACA ... they’re Band-Aids, they are not the
solution. I fear and think a lot of people fear that these Band-
Aids will just keep popping off ... it’s not permanent. It’s like
stuck in this limbo.
Undocumented immigrant community organizer, California457
I would be satisfied even with being a resident.... If I were a
resident I could go back to my country, and I could visit my
family. If there’s an emergency, I could get on a flight and go. I
could get a better job. I could—there are more advantages for
those that have papers than for those that don’t. So I don’t ask for
much, I just ask to be a resident.
Oralia, undocumented immigrant, California458
Like many other forms of covering, immigration status covering
is not without significant disadvantages—some of which are readily
apparent and some of which are less so. Scholars critiquing covering
in other legal contexts underscore the ways in which individual
authenticity, and acknowledgment of the individual’s experiences
and struggles, are either minimized or sacrificed to facilitate
majoritarian comfort.459 This is also the case in the context of
456. Cf. ASHAR ET AL., supra note 15, at 10 n.7.
457. Chacón, supra note 368, at 27 n.85.
458. Id. at 23.
459. See, e.g., Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 59, at 884-86; Brandon Paradise, Militant
Covering, 33 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 161, 176 (2010); Russell K. Robinson, Uncovering Cover-
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immigrant covering. Immigration status covering laws, regulations,
and ordinances at the federal, state, and local levels may enable
immigrants to downplay their disfavored characteristics, most often
undocumented status.460 As a consequence, the majority society in
which the immigrants live may disattend to the harsh realities that
are the hallmark of life for those with limited or no formal immigra-
tion status, and the immigrants themselves may benefit from
greater (superficial) social acceptance and sociocultural integration.
But immigrants subject to immigration status covering measures
are burdened by the temporariness and contingency of the benefits
that they enjoy through those measures, all of which are wholly
dependent on the grace of the majority group, rather than the rights
and human dignity of the immigrants. Moreover, in order to attain
the benefits of the covering laws, immigrants are required to come
forward and report their true underlying status to government
authorities,461 and those authorities could change their policies at
any time and use that information against the immigrants in
question.462 Indeed, following the recent election of President Donald
J. Trump, immigrant advocacy organizations fear such a change
may occur.463 The enduring fragility and vulnerability of the
immigrant’s underlying status is not addressed in any way—if
anything, the very same laws that provide a vehicle for majority
group disattention work to calcify the stigma of being undocument-
ed. By eliding the differences between those lacking immigration
status and those with status, the struggles of various immigrant
communities become decreasingly visible. Further, covering immi-
grants themselves may become complicit in this process, accepting
immigration status covering laws as “good enough,” thereby de-
creasing advocacy for comprehensive immigration reform and the
availability of widespread immigration status conversion. Taken
together, these are the potential harms of immigration status
ing, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1809, 1810, 1838 (2007) (reviewing YOSHINO, supra note 16).
460. Cf. Yoshino, supra note 16, at 772, 864 (discussing how covering downplays
characteristics and the connection between legal regulation and covering).
461. See, e.g., FORM I-821D, supra note 294.
462. See ASHAR ET AL., supra note 15, at 3-4, 20-21.
463. See Max J. Rosenthal, Immigration Lawyers Are Advising Their Undocumented Clients
to Stay in the Shadows, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 23, 2016, 6:03 AM), http://www.mother
jones.com/politics/2016/11/what-immigration-lawyers-are-telling-clients-trump-administration
[https://perma.cc/L4MC-RVVT].
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covering laws—while superficially appealing, they risk cementing
stigmatized undocumented identity at the unobserved core of polit-
ical discourse about immigration.
Impermanence, vulnerability, and absolute reliance on the con-
tinued good grace of the majority define immigration status covering
laws. As discussed in detail in Part II.C, each of the immigration
status covering mechanisms involve some degree of temporariness
and contingency, rather than permanent status transformation and
protection. An integral part of the temporal limitations of the var-
ious federal immigrant covering programs are additional burdens
placed on the immigrant beneficiaries, which they must meet in a
timely fashion or risk being placed in removal proceedings. For
example, DACA and TPS, along with their attendant work au-
thorization grants, must be renewed regularly, which involves
submitting documentary evidence to show that all of the prerequi-
site qualification are still met as well as requiring the payment of
filing fees costing hundreds of dollars, and attendance at a biomet-
rics interview to be photographed and fingerprinted.464 Moreover, all
beneficiaries of federal immigrant programs—whether DACA, TPS,
parole, or administrative closure—must also notify the federal
immigration authorities of their new contact information within ten
days if they move homes.465 In other words, while attempting to
downplay their disfavored characteristics and blend into the main-
stream in their daily lives, vulnerable immigrants are also subject
to constant government surveillance and heightened scrutiny by the
authorities as they attempt to comply with covering laws.
In addition to the heightened monetary burden for the beneficia-
ries of federal immigration status covering initiatives, there is also
a potential burden of increased vulnerability to adverse discretion-
ary decision-making by governmental actors. Although they enjoy
temporary protection from being a removal priority in contrast with
464. The current application fee for DACA, including employment authorization and
biometric services is $495. I-821D, Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals,
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/i-821d [https://perma.cc/TZL8-
9PQ9] (last updated Dec. 22, 2016). The fee for TPS is currently $50, plus an additional $410
for employment authorization, and $85 for biometrics. See Temporary Protected Status, supra
note 350.
465. See 8 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (2012); U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., OMB NO.
1615-0007, FORM AR-11: ALIEN’S CHANGE OF ADDRESS CARD (2015), https://www.uscis.gov/
sites/default/files/files/form/ar-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6C9-739Z].
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other undocumented migrants, their information is also stored in
federal databases and therefore also available to state and local law
enforcement officers.466 This makes them particularly vulnerable to
overenforcement initiatives by police officers—such as “broken
windows” policing in high-immigration areas.467 Moreover, should
they be arrested or detained for minor offenses, they can be
immediately placed in removal proceedings.468 Indeed, immigrant
vulnerability and reliance on discretionary decision-making, what
Professor Jennifer Chacón calls “administrative grace,”469 are in
many respects the hallmark of immigration status covering
initiatives. Although these initiatives are the product of statutory
and administrative rulemaking at the federal, state, and local
levels, there is nonetheless a tremendous degree of discretion
accorded to the federal, state, and local administrators charged with
administering the various programs.470 As discussed in Part II.C,
with respect to federal immigration status covering, it is impossible
to appeal outside the administrative agency for denial of certain
statuses, as in DACA.471 Moreover, the eligibility for that program
is defined entirely in internal memoranda, rather than by statute or
regulation.472
Administrative closure is even more of a “black hole.”473 While
some ICE Chief Counsel offices routinely exercise their prosecuto-
rial discretion to administratively close cases others do so much less
often, and there is no real process to challenge this discrepancy.474
466. See Christine N. Cimini, Hands Off Our Fingerprints: State, Local, and Individual
Defiance of Federal Immigration Enforcement, 47 CONN. L. REV. 101, 105-111 (2014)
(describing the interoperability of DHS and FBI databases and increasing data sharing at the
federal, state, and local level).
467. See Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Essay, Policing Sex, Policing Immigrants: What Crimmi-
gration’s Past Can Tell Us About Its Present and Its Future, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 149, 179-84,
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Covering laws thus serve to decrease both the social visibility of the
disfavored immigrant and to curtail any potential scrutiny of the
treatment that she receives at the hands of governmental actors.
However, the greatest fear shared by many immigrant beneficia-
ries of immigration status covering programs is that because of their
liminal nature, grounded merely in the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, the programs could be abolished at any time.475 When he
announced the DAPA program, President Obama exhorted undocu-
mented immigrants to “come out of the shadows and get right with
the law.”476 But taking the step to abandon immigration status
passing, and to rely instead on covering provisions, could leave the
immigrant beneficiaries socially and politically exposed and
vulnerable to criminal and civil penalties, including deportation, if
the covering programs were to be cancelled.477 A new administration
with different immigration priorities could abolish the DACA and
DAPA programs, institute blanket policies canceling grants of de-
ferred action, or remove countries from the list of those eligible for
TPS.478 Indeed, organizations advising President Trump have
already proposed that he do just that when he assumes office.479 The
very same lack of statutory language, notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing, and judicial oversight that has made federal immigration status
covering possible makes it vulnerable to abolition at any time. The
same is true, albeit to a lesser extent, of state and local initiatives
designed to assist immigrant communities. State legislatures with
different compositions or agendas could abolish previous laws
pertaining to immigrant access to education or driver’s licenses.
Localities could revoke sanctuary city ordinances or cease to issue
municipal IDs. This is far from just a theoretical fear; over the
years, the federal government has promulgated and then abandon-
ed a number of different immigration enforcement priorities,480 and
475. See ASHAR ET AL., supra note 15, at 20.
476. Obama, supra note 303.
477. See ASHAR ET AL., supra note 15, at 20.
478. See CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, A PEN AND A PHONE: 79 IMMIGRATION ACTIONS THE
NEXT PRESIDENT CAN TAKE 5, 8-9 (2016), http://cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/79-actions_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7W52-M2WJ].
479. See Brian Bennett, Yes, Trump Can Boost Deportations and Gut the Dreamer Program
for Young Immigrants, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2016, 7:15 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-
na-trump-immigration-20161109-story.html [https://perma.cc/J88N-Z4D2].
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a number of states have passed and then repealed education access
laws designed to aid immigrant youth.481 This leaves the immigrants
who have outed themselves by providing information to federal,
state, and local government authorities about their biographic
information, including their formal immigration status, uniquely
vulnerable to both social stigma and law enforcement actions,
including those that may ultimately lead to their deportation.
There is also an additional risk in increasing reliance on immi-
gration status covering provisions, rather than legislative and
regulatory rulemaking. Namely that these programs become, by
default, a permanent alternative to immigration lawmaking. The
congressional gridlock over comprehensive immigration reform over
the last twenty years482 and the inflammatory rhetoric around
immigration during the 2016 presidential race483 suggest that it is
highly unlikely that the INA will be reformed in the near future. In
the meantime, 11.3 million undocumented immigrants will continue
to reside in the United States, as will over 2 million nonimmigrant
visa holders, hundreds of thousands of refugees, and millions of
LPRs who are unable or unwilling to naturalize as U.S. citizens.484
Immigration status covering measures may allow these immigrants
to better integrate into mainstream society in the short- and
medium-term, but they do nothing to promote the long-term inte-
gration of all immigrants in the American polity. To the contrary,
these measures functionally reinforce the stigma of being either
undocumented or the holder of a less privileged status, such as
nonimmigrant, by doing nothing to obviate the true underlying
hardships at the core of that status and simultaneously diverting
the majority’s attention away from those hardships.
It is telling that during the 2013 congressional debates about
comprehensive immigration reform, the most contentious issue
481. In 2003, Oklahoma passed an in-state tuition bill for DREAMers but then swiftly
ended DREAMer eligibility in 2008 in passing new OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 3242 (2016) and
amending § 3242(C). In 2009, Wisconsin passed a similar bill, but then repealed it in 2011.
See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 36.27(2)(cr) (West 2010) (repealed 2011).
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Not Ready Enough., WASH. POST (July 14, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2014/07/14/americans-are-ready-for-immigration-reform-they-are-just-not-ready-
enough/ [https://perma.cc/JY5A-ENAK].
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debated was whether to provide an eventual pathway to citizenship
for currently undocumented migrants.485 During the 2016 Republi-
can presidential candidate debates, there was almost universal
condemnation by all the candidates of the idea of a pathway to
citizenship for the undocumented486 and vehement critique by some
candidates of the presence of any undocumented immigrants in the
United States.487 This underscores the continued valence of the stig-
ma of undocumented status. Covering laws do nothing to challenge
or change that stigma. Instead, federal, state, and local governmen-
tal actors have taken steps to reduce the visible hallmarks of being
undocumented—such as an inability to work, drive, attend school,
or get a professional license.488 As with covering in other contexts,
immigrant covering functions in such a way as to reduce the dis-
comfort of the majority. It reduces majoritarian discomfort by
obscuring obvious differences between less privileged immigrants
and their mainstream neighbors. But in so doing, it in no way un-
dermines majority condemnation of unauthorized migration; rather,
it preserves space for the majority to disapprove of the undocu-
mented in theory, without confronting their reality in practice.489
If this situation continues—and there is no reason to believe that
it will not—the covered immigrant communities risk becoming a
permanent, yet invisible, underclass. They will be taxpayers who
are ineligible for government benefits, such as healthcare and social
security retirement. They will be more vulnerable to discrimination
by government entities and employers and less likely to avail
themselves of the protections of the courts. They will be at risk of
chronic overpolicing by the local, state, and federal authorities that
hold their information. They will be disproportionately financially
burdened by regular reregistration requirements. Through all of
485. See Fuller, supra note 482; Sean Sullivan, Rand Paul and Why the ‘Pathway to
Citizenship’ Question Is So Delicate for the GOP, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2013), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/03/19/rand-paul-and-why-the-pathway-to-
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11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/11/us/politics/transcript-of-the-republican-
presidential-debate-in-florida.html [https://perma.cc/5P32-23ZF] (outlining each candidate’s
views on immigration reform).
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this, they will have no options to enjoy the rights and privileges of
their citizen and LPR peers; they will not be able to travel freely or
sponsor family members to join them in the United States. But
precisely because the covering measures have enabled them to enjoy
some degree of integration into the mainstream, for many immi-
grants and their potential U.S. citizen allies, immigration status
covering may be seen as good enough.490 Fear of jeopardizing what
little foothold they have gained in mainstream society through work
authorization, driver’s licenses, or sanctuary ordinances may even
dissuade the immigrant beneficiaries of status covering initiatives
from pushing for meaningful reform that could lead to full status
conversion.491
Moreover, even the most widespread, or potentially far-reaching
immigration status covering programs, such as DACA or DAPA,
cannot reach all of the undocumented immigrants currently living
in the shadows.492 So, in addition to potentially creating a perm-
anent underclass composed of beneficiaries of federal immigration
status covering, reliance on such programs rather than more
thoroughgoing reform also risks the creation of a permanent under-
underclass of the “super undocumented” who are ineligible for any
covering programs.493 These individuals, whether because of crim-
inal records, immigration and removal history, or other family
or associational constraints would be permanently excluded.494
Further, they would be permanently excluded in a sociopolitical cli-
mate within which being undocumented would be perhaps even
more vilified than it is today—precisely because of the success of the
covering laws in fostering majoritarian disattention to the realities
of life for unauthorized immigrants. In short, immigration status
covering may, for many immigrants and their allies, be the only
490. See ASHAR ET AL., supra note 15, at 4.
491. Cf. YOSHINO, supra note 16, at ix-xi (discussing the ways in which covering, by
decreasing minority group visibility, potentially decreases majority understanding of the
minority group’s struggles).
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“Worthiness” Undermines the 1965 Immigration Law’s Civil Rights Goals, 57 HOW. L.J. 899,
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option available right now, but whether it is the best option in the
long-term remains to be seen. 
CONCLUSION
The covering paradigm provides a rich theoretical lens through
which to explore recent developments in immigration law and
policy. Individual immigrants’ experiences of sociocultural assimi-
lation into mainstream U.S. society may involve conversion,
passing, or covering. Immigration laws and policies themselves may
also embody status conversion, status passing, or status covering.
For over thirty years, there has been a lack of meaningful opportu-
nity for widespread immigration status conversion. For over twenty
years, there has been a proliferation of legislative and regulatory
provisions that effectively mandate immigration status passing by
millions of immigrants. One consequence, in the last ten years, has
been the widespread adoption of immigration status covering
instruments at the federal, state, and local levels. This is not to say
that one approach to immigrant inclusion has neatly replaced
another, in an inevitable progression toward greater immigrant
integration. Immigration status conversion, passing, and covering
have long coexisted and continue to exist side by side. Now, more
than ever, immigrants living in the United States are offered a
multiplicity of choices as to how they wish to attempt to integrate
into the American mainstream; either by pursuing assimilation
through formal status conversion, by passing as holders of a dif-
ferent status, or by availing themselves of the covering options
available under federal, state, or local laws. Nevertheless, the
apparent current ascendancy of immigration status covering does
perhaps represent a certain form of “qualified progress” narrative,
albeit one whose long-term prospects are far from clear. 
Immigration status covering may hold great promise for the
integration of immigrants in the short- and medium-term, but it
may simultaneously harm their long-term ability to fully assimilate
into American society. Federal, state, and local immigration status
covering initiatives may facilitate hitherto excluded immigrant
access to education, employment, goods, and services. They may
improve relations with law enforcement personnel and increase
immigrant communities’ social capital. They may even foster more
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robust psychological well-being in immigrant communities. Yet, at
the same time, by their very nature, immigration status covering
laws are temporary, contingent, and dependent on the grace of the
majority, not the rights and dignities of immigrants. Moreover,
widespread acceptance of federal, state, and local covering laws as
good enough may reduce the likelihood of comprehensive immigra-
tion reform and thereby decrease the long-term ability of immi-
grants to vindicate their rights as fully integrated members of
American society. Above all, immigration status covering laws
provide a vehicle that allows the majority to disattend to the
realities of the everyday struggles of unauthorized immigrants,
while simultaneously perpetuating and reinforcing the underlying
stigma of being undocumented. Immigrant covering is thus a
phenomenon to be cautiously celebrated, skeptically interrogated,
and, above all, further explored.
